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No. 7.

CHARACTER-EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.
It has elsewhere appeared that in criminal cases, the character of the
accused is receivable in evidence simply as a fact evidential of the improbability of his having committed the act, which he is accused of, or of having
committed it with the intent, the nfotive, the knowledge, the malice or
other state of mind with which he is accused of having committed it. It
may be said, generally, that in civil cases, no similar u*e can be made of
character. If the question is, whether A did or did not do an act, or
whethee in doing it, he had a certain intent or knowledge, etc., his character, however strongly it may extrajudicially persuade that he did not do or
did do the act, or that, doing it, he had or did not have the intent, knowledge, motive, cannot be proven in order, alone or in conjunction with
other evidence, to.prove or disprove the doing of the act or the doing of it
with the subjective accompaniments.
A constant character for honesty makes a particular act of fraud improbable. Nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot, when the plea and evidence
of the defendant impute fraud to him, give evidence of his good character,
for the purpose of rebutting the evidence of the defendant. The executor,
e. g,., of A suing on a bond, the defense of B was fraud in the
making of a contract which was for the sale of land to B, payThe trial court declined
ment, deficiency in the quantity of land.
in rebuttal to receive evidence of the good character of A and
properly.'
On the other hand, if the plaintiff's cause of action, or the
evidence to support it, is based upon or tends to show a dishonest act of the
defendant, or of his testator or intestate, he will not be allowed to educe,
even by cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, testimony as to the
general character of the defendant, or his testator, or intestate. "There
cannot be the least doubt," said Gibson, J., "but the evidence was improperly received. Gilkeson's general character was not put in issue by
the nature of the action, and it never was pretended, that where a party is
incidentally charged by the evidence, with a commission of a particular
fraud, that the charge can be rebutted by evidence of general good character. To this rule I know of no exception. ' 2 In trespass for the conver'Anderson's
]Xxecutors v. Long, 10 S. & R. 55.
2
Nash v. Gilkeson, 5 S. & R. 352.
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sion of a quantity of yarn, delivered to the defendant to be dyed, the defendant tried to show that it had been delivered to him as agent for a corporation, and that the corporation had used it. To render improbable his
personal appropriation of it, he could not prove his good character.'
As the good character of a party cannot be shown, neither can the bad,
as evidential of other facts. Thus, in debt on a sealed note, the defendant,
in order apparently to corroborate his evidence that it had been paid, proposed to prove the plaintiff's character as to honesty. It was not properly
receivable. 2 "The evidence," said the Supreme Court, "in derogation of
the plaintiff's character, which was not put in issue by the pleadings, ought
not to have been received."
In an action for breach of promise of marriage, testimony that the plaintiff had been guilty of immodesty, could not
be contradicted by proof of her general good conduct and character.8
In Battles v. Loudenslager, 4 a different use of character was attempted.
A had executed a promissory note to B or order, upon which C, as endorsee,
brought suit against A. A, showing that a fraud had been practiced upon
him by B, found it necessary to show further, that C, when he purchased
the note, had knowledge of the fraud, or at least such suspicion of it as made
him a malafide purchaser. In order to do this, A proved various circumstances, viz : C's knowledge of B's insolvency; the badness of B's character
for honesty and integrity, which was known to C; the purchase by C at the
same time of a large number of other notes, which had been procured by B,
by means of the same kind of fraud, etc. The Supreme Court, Sterrett, J.,
remarks, "The character of Sullivan (B) for honesty and integrity ii 187 1 2,
was irrelevant, and could have no other tendency than to mislead or prejudice the jury. * * * * His general reputation for honesty was in no
way involved in the case."
Knowledge of this reputation was proof neither
that C suspected, nor that he ought to have suspected B's fraud on A, or to
have inquired from A; that is, it was not proof to C of the probability of the
specific fraud.
The act which is imputed to the party, may be criminal, and although
character-evidence against its commission would be receivable in a
prosecution for it, such evidence will not be receivable in a civil
action. In a civil action for assault and battery, e. g., the defendant may
not repel the evidence of his guilt or even of his malice by proof of good
character; 5 and in an action on a policy of fire insurance, which the insurer
defends by evidence that the plaintiff set fire to the building in order to defrafid him, the plaintiff cannot employ his good character to repel the
charge. 6 In an action for seduction the defendant cannot prove his "uniform good character." 7
It is not clear whether, in some of the cases just considered, reliance
2'Wood v. Bradbury, 42 L. I. 436.
Atkinson v. Graham, 5 W. 411.
3

Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401.
484 Pa. 446.
5
Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424.
OAmerican Fire Insurance Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530.
7Zitzer v. Merkel, 24 Pa. 399.
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was had upon the character or the reputation for character. In the ease of
assault and battery, in order to rebut any inference of malice, the defendant
offered to prove his "general character-that it was uniformly good-that
he was reputed peaceable and orderly;" and the offer was rejected.' In the
action on the insurance policy, the endeavor was to show the "reputation of
the plaintiffs * * * * as peaceable, orderly, honest and good citizens,
to rebut the alldgation * * * * that they burned this mill." 2 The
improper evidence in Atkinson v. Graham, 3 is described as being in derogation of the plaintiff's "character as to honesty;" in Anderson v. Long, 4
concerning the "character" of the plaintiff "for integrity," and in Nash v.
Gilkeson, 5 the "general character" of the plaintiff was put in evidence by
the defendant.
As evidence of good character for the purpose of proving a specific fact
is not admissible, so the "assumed good character," e. g., of the testator of
the plaintiff, who sues on a due bill, cannot be made the basis of an inference. The question being, e.g., whether the due bill has been paid, and no
evidence as to the character of the deceased payee being given, the court
commits an error when it tells the jury that the "assumed good character"
of the decedent is corroborative of other evidence that the due bill has not
6
been paid.
FORMER ACTS.

In an action for injury arising from the operation of an elevator, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was hurt in attempting to leave the eleva
tor while it was in motion. The evidence as to this attempt was seriously
conflicting, the plaintiff's testimony being contradicted by the operator of
the elevator, who was somewhat corroborated by the only two other passengers on it at the time. It was held proper to exclude evidence that the
plaintiff, a boy of i6 years, had made a practice of jumping from the elevator while in motion. What the boy had done would, it is said, warrant an
inference so "remote," as to make the evidence inadmissible. "Men do not
usually risk life or limb without motive" says Dean, J., "and the fact that a
man has done so once or oftener, does not warrant the induction that he did
so on the particular occasion in controversy." 7 That a man has uniformly
acted under certain conditions in a certain way, does warrant the inference,
with some degree of probability, that on the repetition of the conditions
he acted in a similar way. When, as in the case cited, there was a conflict
'Porter
v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424.
2

American Fire Insurance Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530.
35 W. 411.
&10 S. & R. 55.
55 S. & R. 352.
6Fullam v. Rose, 181 Pa. 138. But it was the absence of evidence as to the

good character, that made the reference to the "assumed" good character erroneous,

in the
7 judgment of Sterrett, C. J.
Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528. In Lauer v. Posey, 15 Super. 543, an action by the
endorsee against the maker of a note, one defense was that the note had been
raised from $100 to $400. Other notes, alleged to have been forged by the same
person, the payee, but with which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had any
relation, were for some reason, received in evidence.
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of evidence as to how the boy acted, his usual way of acting would surely
be of value, for the ordinary reasoner, in determining which of the witnesses
was telling the truth.
EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER OF NON-PARTY.
In ejectment A claims under warrants of 1763 on which was a survey
in 1765, and B, the defendant, under warrants of 1762. A deputy surveyor
having an interest in them, executed the former. It was the custom when
warrants were issued, to make a payment to the State, which payment was
marked on the warrant. There was no such mark on these warrants under
which the plaintiff claimed. This tended to show that these warrants had
been fraudulently obtained by the deputy surveyor. It was, however,
proper for the Court to reject the defendant's offer to prove that the
character-probably the reputation-of the deputy surveyor was bad. He
was, says the Court, not a witness. The title of the plaintiff was not to be
injured by his character, even though the former claimed under him.
"Matters of property," said Tilghman, C. J., "are not to be decided by the
character of the parties. In criminal cases the defendant is permitted to
give evidence of his own good character, and, if he does, he may be contradicted by evidence on the part of the prosecution. But in civil actions,
evidence of character is not permitted, except in certain actions where from
In
the nature of the case, the plaintiff puts his character in issue.""'
Postens v. Postens 2 the plaintiff in ejectment claimed under a sheriff's sale
of X's land, after his death, and the defendant under a grant from X in his
lifetime, which the plaintiff alleged to be without consideration, and in
fraud of creditors of whom he was one. One of the existing debts was to
himself. He proved a settlement with X, for whom he had worked for a
series of years, which was made in the presence of and signed by three
persons. The witness who testified to the settlement was cross-examined
by the defendant as to X's being aged, of poor hearing, paralytic, falling
asleep in the midst of business, and as to the circumstances of the settlement, the manner in which these three persons conducted themselves in
their inquiries and examinations, during the settlement and the footing they
were on with them. The plaintiff was then allowed to ask what the
character and standing of the three men were. The witness replied that
they stood fair, as far as he knew, and stated that they were not arbitrators,
but were called in to help the parties settle. Sergeant, J., remarking that
the previous cross-examination having tended to question the mode in
which these persons conducted themselves, and the fitness of X to transact
such business, and involved indirectly a reflection on those who sanctioned
the settlement, adds "But it is sufficient that in looking to the answer of the
witness it amounts to no more than the law of itself would imply without
proof, that their characters stood fair. This being the case, it could have
done no prejudice to the defendant, even admitting that it would not otherwise have been strictly proper."
'Blackburn v. Holiday, 12 S. & R. 140.
23 S. & R. 127.
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WHEN CHARACTER IS IN ISSUE.

There are civil actions in which the character of a party, or of another
specially connected with him, is said to be in issue, and in such cases, this
character may be put in evidence. "Putting character in issue," says
Tilghman, C. J., "is a technical expression and confined to certain actions,
from the nature of which the character of the parties, or some of them, is of
particular importance. Such is the action brought by one man against another, for seducing his wife, and having criminal connection with her.
There the injury done to the plaintiff consists mainly (sic) in the gooLconduct of his wife, before her seduction, and therefore, the defendant is permitted to show that she was unchaste. So in an action of slander, the
plaintiff in his declaration, asserts his own good character, and avers the intent of the defendant to rob him of it. He puts his character in issue, therefore, and the defendant is at liberty to impeach it."' When the action seeks
to recover damages, altogether or in part for injury to a reputation, the
question is, what is the value of that reputation ? It is competent for the defendant to disclose any defects in it, prior to his having done the act which
is the gravamen of the complaint, in order to show that the reputation he
damaged had less than the normal value. But the mere fact that the evidence of one party, or a verdict in his favor, would damage the reputation
of the other party, does not so put his character in issue as to warrant evidence of prior good character in defense. That the establishment, e. g., by
an insurance company, of the defense that the plaintiff set fire to the building himself, would hurt his reputation, does not justify his offer of evidence
that it has been good. 2
ACTION FOR SEDUCTION.

By actions for seduction, whether of daughter or other female, damages
are in part sought for the injury to the social position and reputation of the
plaintiff, through the injury to the reputation of the female. "True enough"
says Lowrie, C. J., "the parent is entitled to damages for the disgrace
brought upon the family by this stain upon the general good character or
reputation of the daughter, but is entitled to damages only for the loss of
service, if her previous reputation for chastity was bad, and thus reputation
becomes an element of the case." 8 When the seduced female is a mere servant, the damages of the plaintiff, suing as master, would not be affected by
the injury to her reputation, "for certainly" says Ross, J., "the misconduct
of a mere servant girl could not affect the character of the plaintiff's daughters
or bring disgrace upon his family. But, where the seduced is a connection
of the plaintiff, (e. g., the sister of his wife, living in his family), such evidence would not only be very properly received, but would be of great importance in assessing damages.' ' 4 Where a relationship exists between the
seduced female and the plaintiff, proof of the situation of the plaintiff's fam'Anderson v. Long, 10 S. & R. 55; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424.

2American Fire Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530.
3Hoffman
v. Kemerer, 44 Pa. 452.
4

Wilson v. Sproul, 3 P. & W. 49.
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ily, the number of his daughters, their general good character, the family
disgrace, etc., can be shown in aggravation of damages.'
FORM OF THEF PROOF.
The damages are for injury to the reputation. It matters not whether
this reputation is better than is deserved or not. Indeed the courts sometimes optimistically say that there is no danger that a reputation will be
better than deserved. Nor on the other hand can the reputation be shown
to be bad by proof of conduct or special acts. "A person may have a very
good reputation in his or her neighborhood, notwithstanding acts of indiscretion or error" or vice. Hence, the daughter whose seduction is the
ground of the action, cannot be shown, whether through other witnesses,
or by cross-examination of herself, as a witness for the plaintiff, to have had
connection with other men. 2 This is a somewhat singdlar position. The
claim of damages to reputation presupposes that the particular fornication
of which the defendant has been guilty, has impaired the reputation; but
the Courts will not allow proof of prior acts, on the hypothesis that they
also impaired it. Nor, in the action for the seduction, is it necessary to
prove that the seduction had caused, or to what extent it had caused, a
lesion to the reputation, prior to the institution of the litigation. The defendant may show that the reputation of the woman was not good prior to
and at the time of the seduction. The Pennsylvania cases do not show
what, precisely, the content of this reputation must be. A reputation for
being unchaste, would clearly be relevant. Would a reputation for indelicacy of wotds or acts, immodesty, toleration of liberties with her, by men,
not implying sexual coition, be sufficient? Apparently, it is not necessary
to show the reputation down to the time and at the place of the seduction.
The female may have lived at one place, until a year or two before the
seduction, and may have acquired at that place a reputation of being a
prostitute. It is competent, probably, for the defendant to put this reputation in evidence, if it comes down to a time sufficiently near to that of the
seduction, to justify the inference that it pervades the locality at which the
seduction occurred, and colors the opinion of the people there as to the
present character of the woman. 3
PROOF OF GOOD CHARACTER.
The principle is inviolable that the law presumes the character and
reputation of the female to have been good, until they are shown to have
been bad; and that the plaintiff must be content with this presumption until
the reputation has been attacked by the defendant. Until this attack it is
error to allow the plaintiff to prove that the female was a person of good
'Id.
2Hoffman v. Kemerer, 44 Pa. 452. In Zitzer v. Merkel, 24 Pa. 408, in contradiction of the testimony of the daughter denying improper conduct with other
men, the defendant was allowed, but without objection, to prove that about the
time of the seduction she had permitted improper liberties by other men.
3Milliken v. Long, 188 Pa. 411. It was shown that while she lived in Pittsburgh her character was bad. She had since resided at Leechburg, where the
sedu6tion occurred.
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1
character, and that nothing had been heard against her, until the seduction.
And the attack must be by proof of her "general bad character," i. e., of her
2
reputation for unchastity, or looseness. An allegation or an admission by
4
the female, on cross-examination, 3 or proof by other evidence of specific
breaches of chastity, or of permitting improper liberties to be taken by men,
will not justify the reception of evidence of good reputation. Nor will it
justify evidence of good conduct, e. g., that the female has been a modest,
prudent woman and of marked propriety from childhood up to the time of
the seduction. "If," says Woodward, J., "there be a metaphysical distinction between character and conduct, we know of no authority in law for admitting evidence of conduct where evidence of character would be excluded.
* * * * But where any distinction (between conduct and character,
and reputation) is taken, it is for the purpose of saying that the evidence
must relate to reputation, and not to conduct."- 5 After evidence by the defendant of the female's bad reputation, the plaintiff may furnish evidence in
contradiction, i. e., that her reputation was good; and if she has lived at
two places. and the defendant's testimony is that she had a bad reputation
at her former abode, the plaintiff may prove her good reputation at the place
where the seduction occurred, and she still resides. 6

BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

The sexual character of a party to a contract to mjrry, is relevant in
an action on that contract for breach of it. By character here is not meant
reputation but conduct. A woman might conceivably have a bad reputation without deserving it. Her misfortune would probably be no bar to an
action by her. But if without the knowledge of the man, that she has been
lewd and immoral, he contracts to marry her, his subsequent discovery of
this fact will excuse him from performing the contract. The agreement to
marry would be binding only if made with knowledge of the facts. "If,"
says Paxson, J., "he is inveigled into an engagement by a harlot, he is the
victim of a sheer, bald fraud. * * * * It is enough to say that the law
will not enforce a contract of marriage in favor of a party to it, who is not
fit to be married at all. A man is not bound by such a contract, if in ignorance of her true character, he has entered into it with a woman who has
earned an evil reputation by a vicious or reckless life."7 Possibly a divorce
from an earlier husband or wife on the ground of adultery, if unknown by
8
the defendant, when he made his promise to marry, would bar the action.
Sexually immoral conduct since the making of the promise to marry, on the
1

Wilson v. Sproul, 3 P. & W. 49.
2Wilson v. Sproul, 3 P. & W. 49.
3
Wilson v. Sproul, 3 P. & W. 49.
4
Zitzer v. Merkel, 24 Pa. 408; Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401.
5Id.
OMilliken v. Long, 188 Pa. 411.
7VonStorch v. Griffin, 77 Pa. 504. If the promise to marry was made with
knowledge of the past immoral conduct of the promisee, that conduct will not dis-

charge from the promise; Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pittsburg 184.
8VonStorch v. Griffin, 71 Pa. 240. It is not decided here whether the immorality
of the plaintiff prior to the promise, would be a bar to the action or merely mitigate
he damage.
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part of the promisee, unless with the consent of the promisor, will discharge

him or her from the promise, but, if with the promisor's consent, will not
have that effect. I The improper conduct of the defendant since making the
contract, not participated in by the plaintiff, may be shown to enhance the
damages, 2 and improper conduct, on the part of the plaintiff, though not
criminal, if it consists of undue liberties with him or her allowed to others,
whereby his or her reputation is degraded, may be shown in mitigation of
damages when it would not constitute a bar to the action. 3 From this point
of view, the defendant may furnish evidence that since the contract was
made, the plaintiff, a woman, committed a gross indiscretion in suffering a
man to take liberties with her person. 4 The only evidence in rebuttal of
this evidence, would be that which impugned the credibility of the witness
who delivered it, or which contradicted it.
But evidence of the general good character and conduct of the plaintiff
would not be receivable, to make the truth of this adverse evidence improbable. "True or false," remarks Woodward, J., "his testimony (i. e., of the
improper liberties) was not repelled by proof of her general good character.
* * *
* True, the good character of the party increases the improbability of an alleged crime or gross indiscretion, but it does not disprove it.
* *
* * Evidence of character never avails against positive and direct
proof. It is only in cases where the proof is circumstantial, and grounds of
reasonable doubt r~main, that character weighs."
And yet, the value of the
testimony of a witness always rests on his credibility, and the evidence of
this is exclusively circumstantial. It consists in the general preponderance
of truth-telling over falsehood, in the signs of intelligence, candor, etc., found
in the tones, gestures, readiness to respond, etc., of the witness. As, in
criminal cases, the good character may overwhelm direct testimony to the
criminal facts by impairing its credibility, there is no scientific reason for its
not doing so, when the same fact is testified to with a view to deriving civil
consequences from it.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
An arrest of a man for a crime produces a suspicion, at least, in the
community that he is guilty. It is the publication of the fact that he is suspected by the constable or other person causing the arrest. It is, however,
assumed, in Russell v. Shuster, 5 that the plaintiff in an action against the
person who made the arrest, does not so put his character in evidence as to
entitle the defendant to show that it was bad, in mitigation of damages.
Shuster had been arrested by Russell, a constable, 'vithout a warrant. Shus1

Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pittsburg 184; Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401.
2Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pittsburg 184.
3
Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401; Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pittsburg 184.
4Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401.

58 W. & S. 308. In Quinn v. Crowwell, 4 Wh. 334, it is said that the character
of the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution is not in issue, and that it is
consequently unassailable by proof of reputation or of particular instances of misconduct. If it appears that the plaintiff had been indicted for a larceny, he may
show that he was acquitted of it.
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ter's trunk had with his consent been examined, and its contents and his
past habits were the principal evidence against him before the mayor who
committed him, that he had committed burglary. The plaintiff alleged in
his declaration a want of probable cause. This entitled the defendant to
show probable cause; and, therefore, to show that the trunk contained,
when opened at the time of the arrest, the instruments of a burglar. But,
evidence of the character of the plaintiff in mitigation of the damages was
properly excluded, says Gibson, C. J., because a "party whose character is
not put in issue, is not bound to hold himself in perpetual readiness to defend it; otherwise, it was said (in Jones v. Stevens, ii Price, 283) 'any man
might fall a victim to a combination made to ruin his reputation and good
name, even by means of the very action he should bring to free himself from
It is hard to realize, however, if the
the effects of malicious slander.'"
plaintiff intends to claim compensation for injury to his reputation on account of the arrest, how he fails to understand that the worth of his reputation will be in issue. The offer by the defendant in an action for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment to show that the plaintiff's general
character was bad after the complaint had been made before the alderman,
to rebut the proof of want of probable cause, was, it was held in Winebiddle
v. Porterfield,I properly rejected, for the reasons (i) because it could not have
induced the action of the defendant, and (2) because it might have been occasioned, in great part at least, by the accusation and incarceration. It was
intimated, however, that it might have been offered in mitigation of damages, had the badness of the character been "on subjects unconnected with
the charge made by the defendant." If so, it is difficult to understand why
the badness of the character, with regard to the traits involved in the matter
on which the arrest was founded, before the arrest, would be inadmissible,
in mitigation of damages.
LIB4L AND SLANDE4R.

A slander or libel is a tort which injures or tends to injure reputation,
and the action founded upon it seeks to recover compensation for this injury.
The character of the plaintiff is therefore in issue in such an action, unless
the plea of the defendant excludes it from the issue. The plea of justification confines the defendant to the proof of the truth of his charge, and he is
precluded from showing that that character of the plaintiff which the defamation touches, was before the defamation, not good, 2 but, when the plea
4
3
of "not guilty" is pleaded, either alone or in conjunction, as it may be,
with that of justification, the defendant may, for the purpose of mitigating
19 Pa. 137..

2

Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393. In Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170, the court
refrained from deciding whether, when the plea was "justification" only, the defendant could show that the reputation of the plaintiff had been, generally, bad,
but did decide that he could not show that the specific reputation assailed by the

slander or libel, e. g., the reputation for truth, for chastity, for honesty, was bad.
This case is overthrown by Conroe v. Conroe, 47 Pa. 198, says Moyer v. Moyer, 49
Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393.
Pa. 210;
3
Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347; Smith v. Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481; Long v.
S W. 439.
Brougher,
4
Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393; Smith v. Buckecker, 4 R. 295.
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the damages, prove the badness of the plaintiff's reputation, prior to the
slander or libel.
PARTICULAR BAD ACTS.

All reputation is or ought to be founded on acts or words. One that is
not, is either better or worse than what is deserved. It does not follow,
however, that bad- acts can be proven by the defendant, in a slander or libel
action in order to show what sort of a man the plaintiff has been, or what
his reputation is or ought to be. The character evidence must not "descend
to particular acts of bad conduct"' even were these acts proven by the defendant himself, or by proof of his admissions. In an action of slander for
charging the plaintiff with copulation with a beast, it is not proper to prove
an admission four or five years ago, by the plaintiff, that he had committed
a similar crime on the body of another animal. The objection is not merely
that the plaintiff would be unapprised that the attack would be made upon
him and unable to defend himself 2 for even had he been informed by a plea,
that the attack would be made, it would not be allowed, "so inveterate is
the rule," remarks Gibson, C. J., "that character can be impeached but by
general evidence of its condition." 3 Informing us that the rule is "inveterate" is scarcely to vindicate it. Perhaps the reason for it is, that a person
is entitled to exemption from detraction from his reputation, except by expressions of the truth, though his reputation be undeserved 4 and, to prove
the former bad act would not prove that the reputation did not exist, but
merely that it was better than it should have been. " Even if a plaintiff,"
remarks Kennedy, J., "should be guilty of one offense (or two, or twenty)
that furnishes no reason or justification for falsely and groundlessly charging him with another, nor ought it to be considered any extenuation of the
conduct of a slanderous defendant. 5
R4PUTATION.

The injury which the plaintiff in slander or libel cases complains of, is
the "loss of good character," that is, of his reputation for good character.
Hence, it is pertinent to the issue to inquire whether he had a good character, for if he did not, he could not lose it by the act of the defendant. The
extent of the injury growing out of the libel or slander, would depend in
some degree at least, upon the goodness or badness of the general character
before the publication of it. The amount of compensation ought to be comITaylor Evid. quoted by Read, J., Moyer v. Moyer, 49 Pa. 210; Fitzgerald v.

Stewart,
53 Pa. 343.
2
Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347; Long v. Brougher, 5 W. 439.

In the former case,

Kennedy, J., observes that "although the plaintiff may be considered as having

put his general character in issue and therefore bound to sustain it or abide the
consequences yet it would be unreasonable to suppose that he could, or to require
that he should, come prepared to encounter and refute every act or appearance of
indiscretion or crime that might be imputed to him in the whole course of his life,
without any previous notice given to him that such charges were intended to be
made."
3
Long v. Brougher, 5 W. 439.
4Hoffman v. Kemerer, 44 Pa. 452.

"Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347.
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mensurate with and in proportion to the extent of the injury. Hence, the
defendant is permitted to show that the reputation of the defendant was that
he was of bad character.
Whether the defendant may shovV that the character, generally, was
bad, which the plaintiff was reputed to have, and whether he may show that
the particular character, g~rmane to the imputation in the slander or libel,
was reputed to be bad, has been a subject of dispute. The defamation may
derogate from the general character, or from some specific character. A
may print of B that he was a bad man, not specifying his kind of badness or
he might impute to him falsehood, drunkenness, unchastity, fraud, violence.
A libel being against a clergyman (what it charged does not appear though
apparently, drunkenness was at least one of the imputations) it was held
that the defendant should have been allowed to prove that "the general
character of the plaintiff was bad." "It was altogether proper for the jury,"
says Kennedy, J., "who were to assess the amount, to know what standing
and character the plaintiff had in society anterior to the publication of the
libel."' The slander consisting in saying of a woman that she was a whore,
the court allowed the defendant to show that "her general reputation (not
2
her general reputation for chastity) was bad."
SPECIALIZING THE CHARACTER.

When the libel or slander has assailed some special department of
character, it is permissible for the defendant to show that the reputation of
the plaintiff in regard to it, has been bad. In an action for slander in saying that the plaintiff had committed perjury, the defendant could prove in
mitigation of damages, the general bad character of the former, for truth
and veracity. "So, where the charge is of dishonesty, or immorality, or
want of chastity, the evidence in each case would be of a general bad reputation for either of these vices With regard to want of veracity, or lying,"
says Read, J., it "may be a confirmed habit in persons of otherwise excellent
character, as we all of us know of notable examples of men of integrity who
are known to be habitual liars. When, therefore, the alleged slander is an
accusation of perjury, it seems inevitable that the defense might be a bad
general reputation for veracity, while the general reputation for integrity
and honesty might be good." 3 Hence the slander being a charge that the
plaintiff had, on a specified occasion, perjured himself, evidence should be
permitted from the defendant, that the plaintiff's general character for truth
and veracity was bad in his neighborhood. 4 The slander imputing being a
whore, the plaintiff's bad reputation for chastity, is receivable.5 "If her
'Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347.

2Conroe v. Conroe, 47 Pa. 198; Smith v. Buckecker, 4 R. 295.
3

Moyer v. Moyer, 49 Pa. 210. The reasoning in Steinmanv. McWilliams, 6 Pa.
170, would make specialization of character improper. It was there held improper,
in a suit for slander in charging the plaintiff with an act of perjury, for the defendant to show the plaintiff's bad reputation for truth and veracity. The plea was
justification.
4Moyer v. Moyer, 49 Pa. 210.
5
Conroe v. Conroe, 47 Pa. 198. The court below had admitted evidence of bad
general character, but not of bad character as to chastity.
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reputation for chastity," says Strong, J., "was bad before the slander of the
defendant was uttered, can it be said that the injury sustained by her from
the wrong of the defendant, is the same as it would have been if her reputation for chastity had been untarnished? * * * * * A man may have
many virtues, and consequently a good general reputation, and yet be notorious for a single vice. If his virtues be called in question, it is an injury, but if only his vice be asserted, his injury is less. It is already said
that the plaintiff in this case has put her reputation for chastity in issue.
Her averment is not that her reputation for, all the virtues which go to
make up good character was fair, but that her reputation for chastity was
sound. And it is that, she complains, has been taken from her. Its real
value was therefore a proper subject for inquiry. It would be strange if the
defendant may not show it to have been worthless."'
EXTENT OF SPECIALIZATION.

To what extent the bad character, put in evidence by the defendant,
may be specialized, is an interesting question. When the slander imputes a
general class of acts, e. g., of being a thief, of being a prostitute, of being a
drunkard, of being a liar, the defendant may doubtless show the reputation
of the plaintiff for being such. If the slander imputes one specific act, e. g.,
that of having stolen a sheep, the defendant may show, not merely the
plaintiff's bad reputation for honesty, but reputation for the particular form
of dishonesty presupposed in stealing, may be inquired into. It was, in
such case, error for the trial court to confine the defendant to the questioni
"What is the general reputation of the plaintiff for honesty?" He should
be allowed to ask "What is the general reputation of the plaintiff as to being a thief?" "It was," says Paxton, J., "his reputation for larceny, for
stealing, for being a thief, that was in issue. Honesty is a broader term
and has a different meaning. It is true stealing may be embraced
within it. A thief is always a dishonest man. But the converse of the
proposition is not true. A man may be dishonest, and yet not be a thief.
A man who does not pay his debts, having the means to do so, or who
deals unfairly, may be regarded as dishonest, yet, without more, could not
be called a thief. Some of the witnesses in this case testified that the plaintiff's general reputation for honesty was bad, but qualified it by saying "it
arose from plaintiff's dealing." It is easy to see how the modification of
the form of the question affected the defendant. To all the evidence tending to show that the plaintiff's reputation for honesty was bad, the latter
could reply that it was the result of other causes than stealing, that no one
had ever charged him with that.' ,2
SPECIALIZATION GERMANE TO THE IMPUTED ACT.

As a man may have some virtues and some vices, he has a right to the
reputation for the former, despite the latter. If his reputation for the
former is injured by the defamation, is it relevant to show that he has the
1

2 Id.

Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. 393.
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reputation also for the latter? In the absence of evidence on the subject, it
would be presumed that his reputation as to all moral traits, was good, but
the injury to it would consist in charging the particular vice or vicious act
mentioned in the slander or libel. Would the amount of this injury be
lessened by the fact that the reputation in other respects was already defective? Does a man without reputation of a single vice suffer a greater
loss when a particular vice is falsely imputed to him, than one with a just
reputation for one vice and many virtues, when a vice of another class is
falsely imputed to him? In Smith v. Buckecker,' the slander imputed being a whore to the plaintiff and fornication with two named persons. The
dei'endant was not allowed to show that she was reputed a thief before the
utterance of the slander. The justifications for the refusal mentioned by
Kennedy, J., are, the evidence could not extenuate the defendant's offense
but would be an aggravation of it; and the reputation of being a thief may
have been created by the defendant. But, why is not evidence of any bad
reputation an aggravation? It is never allowed to extenuate the offense but
to show that the damage arising from it is not as great as it would have
been, had the reputation been fair. There is always the possibility that the
reputation for being a thief, or a prostitute, may have been started by one
person, and that that person was the defendant. This possibility has not
excluded the defendant's evidence of bad reputation. 2 The real question is,
whether imputing vice a to a man, who has a reputation of having vice b
only, inflicts as great a loss upon him, a loss which is entitled to as large a
compensation, as it would had he no reputation of vices at all. If it does,
it would be irrelevant to show that the plaintiff had vice b, but if it does
not, it would be relevant to prove the reputation for vice b. Another question is whether the answer to the interrogation just propounded, is to be
given by the court or by the jury. If by the jury, it could be relevant to
admit the proof of the reputation for vice b; whereas, if the decision is to
be made by the court, and is affirmative, the evidence should be excluded.
PROHIBITED SPECIALIZATION.

Proof of the plaintiff's reputation of having done the particular act
ascribed to him by the slander or libel, when it ascribes a particular act is,
it seems, not allowable. The slander imputing to a woman fornication, the
fact that there had been in "general circulation," before the utterance of the
slander, suspicions and reports that she, an unmarried woman, had given
birth to a child, could not be employed by the defendant to mitigate the
damages, unless the plaintiff himself originated them. 3 The slander consisting in charging the plaintiff with stealing apples on a certain occasion,
evidence for the defendant that this imputation was "in general circulation
in the neighborhood" is properly excluded. " The general issue only,"
14 R. 295.
2A point against the evidence was also, that it did not show that the plaintiff
was "generally reputed" but only that she was "reputed" to be a thief. "She might,"
says3 the court, "have been reputed, that is, accounted such, by one or two persons."
Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 53 Pa. 343. The action being by husband and wilf for
slander of the wife, if the husband told the story to the defendant, in order that she
might repeat it, there could be no recovery. Tibbs v. Brown, 2 Grant 39.
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says Woodward, C. J., "had been pleaded, and under this, whilst the defendant might assail the general character of the plaintiff, he might not, as
I understand our decisions, give evidence of particular reports, not even of
the general currency of the particular charge which he took up and endorsed," i. e., repeated. 1 B alleging of A that he, A, had been in the penitentiary of Massachusetts, B, when sued for slander, could not show for the
purpose of reducing damages, that a general report had pervaded the
neighborhood, before the utterance of the slander, that A had been in the
penitentiary of Massachusetts. 2 This evidence is not admissible for any purpose, 3 not to show that the reputation of the plaintiff had already suffered;
and not to show that defendant probably believed the charge and was not
actuated by the highest degree of malice. If, says Strong, J., the currency of
the report was not known to the defendant, it did not show a less degree of
malice. "And if it were known, it ought to be regarded no apology for her
that others were repeating similar slanders, " 4 and he suggests, as some of
his predecessors had done, 5 that the defendant may have been the author
of the prior reports.
To the suggestion that the earlier reports of the same charge may have
originated with the defendant, it may be replied that they may not have so
originated. Although, in the absence of evidence, perhaps the presumption
would be convenient that they did originate with him, what would be the
attitude of the court, if he furnished evidence that he did not start them?
To use the reports as proof of the truth of the fact charged, would not be
permissible since proof of reputation cannot be used to prove the specific
reputed fact. 6 To the position that the currency of reports could have no
bearing on the attitude of the defendant's mind or the degree of malice, the
reply may be made that if these reports are believed, there would be less
malice in repeating them, than if they were not believed, and if exemplary
damages are recoverable in slander or libel 7 it might be important for the

1

Lukehart v. Byerly, 53 Pa. 418.
Pease v. Shippen, 80 Pa. 513. Cf. Kennedy v. Gregory, 1 Binn. 85; Beehler

2

v. Steever, 2 Wh. 313; Smith v. Stewart, 5 Pa. 372.
3Pease v. Shippen, 80 Pa. 513; Lukehart v. Byerly, 53 Pa. 418.

4Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 53 Pa. 343.

5
Kennedy, J., Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347; Smith v. Buckecker, 4 1R. 295. In
Long v. Brougher, 5 W. 439, the defendant offered to prove that long before his
slander, reports were in circulation, i. e., told to him, that the plaintiff had done the
act which he charged in the slander. Gibson, C. J., seems to admit that the circulation of these reports might be received in "extenuation of malice," but for the
fact that there had been a wide interval between the circulation and the slander,
and for the further fact that the defendant, sued for an earlier utterance of the
same slander, compromised the suit by paying a small sum of money. This was
an implied admission that the charge was groundless, and the defendant cannot
now recur to the earlier reports, as an apology for his reiteration of the slander,
or for the mitigation of the damages.
6
The defendant in a slander case, proved that the slanderous matter had been
told her by the husband of the plaintiff, (the husband was a co-plaintiff), for the
purpose of rebutting malice. It was error to allow proof of the bad character of
the husband in order to show that the defendant ought not to have believed him.
Tibbl v. Brown, 2 Gr. 39
7
As they are; Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346.
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defendant to negative any special malice by showing his belief in the reports
in circulation. I
In Long v. Brougher, 2Gibson, C. J., thus argues against allowing proof
of the circulation of the same report as that alleged in the slander which is
sued for, in mitigation of damages: "But it surely does not lessen the injury that the plaintiff's character bleeding from a thousand wounds, has received only the finishing blow from the defendant. Who can say that it
would not have weathered the storm had it not sunk at last under the accumulated weight of the defendant's wrongs? I am unable to see the
justice of estimating character by its fragments, or of treating as matter of
extenuation, the fact that the injured party had suffered the same, prejudice
from another. The blow may fall the heavier on sensibilities morbid from
the repetition of injury. * * * * It would be no extenuation of the
putting out of an eye that the other had been put out before. * * * *
Now it seems to be irreconcilable to the dictates of justice, that previous
outrage should have been made an invitation to aggression by cheapening
the consequehce of it to the perpetrator." It is worth while reflecting how
far this logic is consistent with the principle that the object, at least in
part, of the action for libel or slander, is to compensate for the injury to
reputation, and that an already damaged reputation is not as much hurt either
by the imputation of a new vice or the repetition of the charge, already
circulating, of a vice, as an unblemished reputation is.' If a number of
men, successively and without concert, injured the horse of X, until finally
one of them administered a blow which killed it, he would hardly be chargeable with the value of the horse as it was before the series of injuries commenced. Each guilty man would be liable for the loss he occasioned, and
not for all the losses occasioned by the earlier tort-feasors, as well as by
himself. Something could be said for the policy of not allowing any proof
of blemished reputation when a defamation, whose truth the defendant is
unable to establish, has occurred; but if the principle is to be conceded
that the defendant, when he fails to plead and prove the truth of his slander
or libel, may show that the reputation of the plaintiff for some trait of
character was already bad, it is difficult to realize why he cannot show that
there was a general credit more or less strong given to reports that he had
done the act alleged against him, before the defendant's utterance of the defamatory statement, provided it is made to appear that he is not responsible
for the circulation of these reports.
If it be said that there is this important difference between the cases,
that there is no such reason to doubt the justness of the bad reputation, as
there is to doubt the justness of the prior editions of the slanderous charge,
it may be replied that this difference is illusory. It is unsafe to say, because a defendant does not take the risk of proving the truth of his charge,
'In Long v. Brougher, 5 W., Gibson, C. J., intimates a doubt of the opinion of
Starkie, that damages in slander cases are given "not to punish, but to compensate."
25 W. 439.
aConroe v. Conroe, 47 Pa. 198; Henry v. Norwood, 4 W. 347.
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that he really, and not fictitiously merely, concedes the untruth of it. He
may be able to prove that the derogatory reports had been circulated, and
be unable, or think himself unable, to convince a jury of their truth, just as
he might be able to prove the derogatory general reputation, though he
would despair of being able to prove its correspondence with the actual conduct and character of the plaintiff.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL OF BAD CHARACTER.
The law presumes the slandered or libelled person to have the ordinarily
good character and good reputation. He is not permitted to show that his
reputation is better than the ordinary, nor even to show that it is ordinarily
good, unless it has been assailed at the trial, by the defendant's evidence
that it is bad. This principle obtains, whatever the nature of the defamation which is the ground of action, whether, for example, it charges the
plaintiff with being a whore' or with having, on an occasion perjured him4
3
self, 2 or with having stolen a whip, or with being implicated in a burglary,
or with being a robber.,' When the evidence of the defendant attacks the
reputation or character of the plaintiff, the latter may prove that he had a
good reputation. Thus, the slander having alleged a perjury and the defendant having, at the trial, given evidence that the character of the plaintiff
was not good, the plaintiff should be allowed to show that it was good. 6
The slander accusing of being a robber, after evidence impugning the plaintiff's reputation, he can prove his "general character for honesty." In
Chubb v. Gsell, 8 it is decided that when the defendant, though not attacking the plaintiff's reputation, gives evidence, in rebuttal of his own malice,
of the circumstances that might have justified his suspicion that the plaintiff
had done the act charged, the plaintiff cannot show his reputation, (e. g., for
honesty and integrity, the slander having charged the theft of a whip), though
the circumstances proven might lead the jury also to suspect that the plaintiff
had in fact done the act charged,(the plea being "not guilty"). "His reputation," says Strong, J., "may have been untarnished, and yet the circumstances under which the actionable words were spoken may have been such
as to indicate that there was very little malice in the defendant." To describe these circumstances in order to account for defendant's making a
charge without malice is not to indicate that the plaintiff's reputation was
bad. The circumstances may have been known to none but the defendant.
Proof by the defendant, that the charge of the plaintiff's being a whore was
made to him by the husband of the plaintiff, (the husband being a co'Tibbs v. Brown, 2 Grant 39.
2

Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170.
3Chubb v. Gsell, 34 Pa. 114.
4
Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346.
5
Petrie v. Rose, 5 W. & S. 364.
GSteinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170.
7Petrie v. Rose, 5 W. & S.364. This case is disapproved in Chubb v. Gsell, 34
Pa. 114, but, "rather hastily," says Mitchell, J., in Clark v. The North American
Co., 203 Pa. 346.
834

Pa. 114.
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plaintiff) before he repeated it, does not attack thereputation of the plaintiff
so as to justify proof of her good character.' The attack on the reputation,
however, says Mitchell, J.,2 may be just as direct and damaging by slurs and
insinuations thrown into the jury box, by abuse of cross-examination, as by
calling witnesses under a definite offer. In such cases the result is the same,
and plaintiff should have the same opportunity to protect himself. How
far there has been a direct attack may depend on manner and emphasis, as
well as on the words used, and therefore it is a matter to be left largely in
the discretion of the trial judge. It is the fact, rather than the manner, of
the atfack, that entitles the plaintiff to protect himself. In the case just
cited, the libel imputing burglary, the plaintiff was called by the defendant
for cross-examination. He was asked whether certain stolen goods had not
been found in the rear of his house; and how it happened that two of the
thieves of city property were his brothers, and were located at the rear of his
house, and he, though a watchman, did not know it. He was further asked
whether four city papers had not &ntained a report of the arrest of his
brother describing him as "watchman of Starr Garden Park," a position
which plaintiff himself held. It was the answers to these questions, says
the court, that justified the plaintiff in insisting that he should be allowed
to prov that his reputation was good. 3 But, the attack on the reputation
which is supposed to justify such proof, has been held to be, not that which
affects the opinion of the jury, concerning the plaintiff, but that which
shows that the general opinion of the community, prior to the slanderous
imputation concerning the character of the plaintiff, was bad. The object
of the plaintiff's rebutting evidence, is not to rehabilitate himself with the
jury, but to show that his community reputation was not bad, as the defendant represents it, but good. Nothing in the evidence given by the defendant in the case last cited, attacked this community-reputation, unless
we adopt the principle that the wide publication of a defamation is itself
evidence of the greater or less credence of it by its readers. If the case is
authority for the principle that, if the defendant's evidence connects suspicious acts with the plaintiff, so as to impair the confidence of the jury in
his character (not in the sense of reputation) he may show his good reputation, it must be regarded as a departure from earlier precedents. The
good reputation of a man would be substantially used to prevent the jury's
believing certain imputed acts, or to prevent its drawing discreditable ininferences from these acts; a use not warranted by the earlier cases.
ACTION BY MOTHER FOR SON'S WAGES.

The act of May 4 th, 1855, 4 gives to the mother, when the father, from
drunkenness, profligacy or other cause, neglects or refuses to provide for his
child or children, all the rights of a father; "Provided always that she shall
'Tibbs v. Brown, 2 Grant 39.
v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346.
The plaintiff ought also, says the court, to be allowed to show that he had a
trade and worked at it honestly.
4P.L. 430; 1 P. & L. 1506, 2902.
2
Clark
3
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afford them a good example and properly educate and maintain them according to her ability, and provided That if the mother be of unsuitable character to be intrusted as aforesaid, or dead, the proper court may appoint
a guardian of such children," etc. An action by her, under the statute, for
the wages of a son thirteen years old, puts in issue her character. It will be
presumed good, until shown to be bad. In Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co.,'
her bad reputation for chastity was proven, apparently as evidence of the
fact of unchastity, for it can scarcely be held that a woman actually chaste
should be denied the benefit of this statute, because unfortunately she had
an untrue reputation. She also stated, on cross-examination, that she had
had a man arrested for adultery with her. She was denied the right to recover. To what extent under this act may the woman be surprised with
proof of specific bad acts? If a bad reputation is not ipsofacto a forfeiture
of the rights conferred by the statute, and it may be used merely as proof of
bad character, i, e., of bad conduct, it is a very exceptional case. Proof of
bad reputation is generally receivable only when the reputation itself is the
basis of a right; not when conduct is the basis of the right and in order to
prove the conduct.
PROVING CARE.
If a right to recover against A rests on the presence or absence of habitual carefulness in B, the absence of this carefulness can be proven by reputation, and not by special acts of carelessness. In an action by A against
an employer for an injury arising from the negligent act of B, a fellow employee, the defendant is liable only if B had been habitually negligent, prior
to the time of the hurt. That he had been, could not be proven by his having had several collisions, and his having been fined for them by his employer, a railroad company, on the ground that they were due to his carelessness. The character for care, can be proven only by the reputation for
it, and not by special acts. "Character grows out of special acts, but is not
Careful men sometimes commit careless acts. Particuproved by them."
lar acts of error sometimes lead to great improvement. Special acts very
often indicate frailties or vices that are altogether contrary to the character
actually established. This, then, is an instance in which the reputation is
accepted as proof of actual habitual conduct or character. 2
WHEN FALSE REPORT OF CHARACTER IS A FRAUD.
The representation of X's character may be made to A in order to induce him to do something, e. g., to make a devise, or to omit to make
one. When the act can be set aside because of the falseness of this representation, evidence of the actual character of X may be given. Thus, a will having pretermitted a son, it may he shown that the will was procured by a
representation to the testator that the wife of this son was an extravagant
woman, keeping liquors, and giving parties, "as bad a woman as any in
1120 Pa. 299.
ZFrazier v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104.
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Lancaster;" who would dissipate anything that might be given to her husband. In a controversy devisavit vel non, the opponents of the will may
show, that the son's wife had a general good character and behaviour.'
Whether the evidence was by those who knew her, that her conduct was
good, or whether it was of a reputation she had, is not clear. It is described as "evidence of general character," but the court remarks, "of conduct such as this she had Jbeen accused to the testator, and the defendants
ought to have had an opportunity of proving the accusation false by showing she had behaved herself well." In another case, 2 a testator was induced to pass his children by and give all his estate to three women. At the
trial of the issue, it was proven that these women had represented each other
to him to be persons of virtue and good character, and thus induced him to
make them legatees. It was competent to show that 'they were women
of bad character. "Under these circumstances," says Tilghman, C. J.,
"I have no doubt that the evidence was admissible, because it had a
tendency to prove that the testator had been deceived by falsehood." It
does not appear whether the evidence was of persons who knew the women,
and testified to their character as they knew it, or of persons who testified to
their reputations; probably the former.
WILLIAM TRICKETT.
1
2 Dietrick

v. Dietrick, 5 S. & R. 207.
Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 325.
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BOOK REVIEWS.
We have before us the two volumes of
the second edition of Abbott's Trial Brief,
dealing with the subject of pleadings in
civil actions.
The first treats of demurrers in proceedings at law, in equity, and under the new
procedure. The second volume treats of a
different aspect of pleading, arising from
the submission of questions of fact upon
the trial of a cause. The different actions
are treated in both volumes separately,
making a ready reference easy.
The plan of the first edition has been

followed in making a brief statement of
the principle in the text, followed by a
citation of the authorities in the various
States. Where there is a conflict of decision, the dissenting authorities are noted.
The notes are more valuable, in that they
do not consist merely of the name of the
case, but furnish to the practitioner a brief
and concise statement of the facts involved.
These volumes will doubtless meet with
the same success as the earlier books of
the series.

MOOT COURT.
trary intent is apparent. Shellcross's Estate, 200 Pa. 122; Johnston v. Morton, 37
Pa. 377; Woelpees' Appeal, 126 Pa. 562;
Active andpassive trusts defined-Passive Grimm's Appeal, 87 Pa. 9.
The estate vested in the sons upon their
trusts not sanctionedby the law-Trustee
; for to continue the trust longer
may be compelled to join in a conveyance majority
would have been contrary to the Act of
by the cestui que trust-Doctrineof accu- April 18, 1853, forbidding trusts for accumulations.
mulations. Shellcross's Estate supra;
Act of April 18, 1853, P. & L. 4055 ; Washington's Estate, 75 Pa. 102.
STATEKENT OF THE CASE.
IN RE ESTATE OF DONALDSON.

Samuel Donaldson left by his will, a
farm to Peter Davis, to hold in trust for
his only two sons, Alfred and James, until they should be forty years of age, and
then to convey to the two sons or the survivor of them. When the youngest was
thirty years of age, the two sons conveyed
to James Dill, and this suit is to compel
the trustee to join in the conveyance.
AmERMAN and HoucK for the complainant.
The period ofsurvivorship is to be taken
as the death of the testator unless a con-

BENJAMIN and Yocum for the respond-

ent.
The testator has expressed his intention
that the trust shall continue until each
shall arrive at the age of forty years. It
is an active trust in the nature of a spendthrift trust, and cannot be executed during this period declared for its execution.
Kelley's Estate, 193 Pa. 45.
The intention of the testator as clearly
expressed in the will, that the word survivor should relate to the death of the
children and not his own death. Arnold
v. Jack, 24 Pa. 57 ; Keet v. Demer, 66 Pa.
326 ; Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

In deciding this case there are several
different points that should be discussed
separately. First, as to whether this is an
active or passive trust ; if an active, then
perhaps it would be legal and should be
sustained; if passive, it is void after the
cestuis que trustents have reached their
majority, as being in restraint of alienation. Second, is it a trust for accumulation ?
Before deciding the first point we must
find out just what an active and passive
trust are, and what they stand for in the
eyes of the law. An active trust is one,
according to the authorities, where the
trustee has certain discretionary duties to
perform; such as the collection of rents
and profits and the investment of the
trust funds. A passive trust is one in
which the trustee has no active or discretionary duties to perform, but merely holds
the title for the benefit of the cestui que
trust. Such a trust under the law would
be void and executed for the benefit of the
cestui que trust. Kunkle's Estate, 8 Dist.
615. In this case the trust is created merely to postpone the vesting of an interest in
the estate, and it would therefore be void
and executed. McCune v. Baker, 155 Pa.
503; Kunkle's Estate, supra.
Further, we find that the trustee is
directed to convey the estate to the beneficiaries when they, or the survivor of
them, reaches the age of forty years. This
direction is of no consequence. A trust to
convey, under the laws of Pennsylvania,
is executed and the legal estate vested
without any conveyance. Lare's Estate,
8 Dist. 265; Chamberlain v. Mayn6s, 180
Pa. 39; Bacon's Appeal, 7 Smith, 504.
Moreover, such a trust ceases when each
child reaches majority, inasmuch as the
law after then does not permit any restraint upon absolute ownership. Gray on
Perpetuities, 102; Shellcross's Estate, 9
Dist-388; S. C., 200 Pa. 122.
Allowing that this is an active trust, the
cestuis que trustent all being sui juris and
the beneficial owners of the property could
waive the trust for conveying at a future
time and agree to an immediate conveyance. Henderson's Estate, 39 L. '450.
It has been argued that this is a case to
which the doctrine of accumulation applies, and hence the Act of April 18, 1853,

P. L. 503, which declares tha.t all such
trusts are void upon the beneficiary reaching majority. But we think from the imperfect statement of the facts that this
does not apply, for there is no direction to
the trustee to hold and collect the rents
and profits until the sons reach the age of
forty years, but merely to hold the legal
title and at the time specified make conveyance of the said title to them.
The rule seems to be that wherever the
rights of a remainderman would not be interfered with, the trust will be executed.
Now, we think that this should be done
in this case, and as the counsel for the
complainants hiEve asked the court to
make a decree compelling the trustee to
join in the conveyance, we think that it
should be made following the ruling in
Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. 31, viz: When the
nominal trust beclouds the title and embarrasses the right of alienation, a conveyance will be decreed in accordance with
the practice of the courts of chancery.
Conveyance decreed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The farm was devised to Davis in trust
for the two sons of the testator until they
should attain the age of 40 years. But it
was not then to be conveyed to them unconditionally. If one should have died
before the other, before both had reached
that age, the land was to be conveyed to
the survivor. They had, therefore, contingent cross-remainders. If both died before reaching the age of 40 years, no conveyance was to be made. The gift of the
remainder to the survivor was therefore
not absolute. It was conditional on his
becoming 40 years old. If he did not, the
testator was intestate as to the residue.
It is true that there is no explicit definition of duties to be performed by the trustee.
There are cases which hold that the trust
will nevertheless be valid, if there are contingent remainders; or other interests,
given to other persons than the cestui que
trust. Perhaps the limitation of the remainder implies active duties, meanwhile,
though they are not formally expressed.
Ingersoll's Appeal, 86 Pa. 240. One of the
points made in McCune v. Baker, 155 Pa.
503, is that, "the trust was dry," and, there
was an "absence of a gift over." Harmony
in the decisions is not to be looked for, and
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there are cases contra, e.g., Phila. Trust,
Safe Dep. &c., Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 209.
There is no prohibition against the cestuis
que trust aliening their interests, as such
to a stranger, nor against their aliening
the contingent remainders to the same
stranger. If they had done so, it could
scarcely be contended that the trust would
still have any useful purpose. It could
not have been the testator's intention to
make a trust for a stranger. N,,r, is it to
be believed that he intended the trust for
the benefit of his heirs. The cestuis que
trust having conveyed to Dill, have passed
to him their interest in the trust, and their
cross-remainders. The court has properly
concluded that the trustee should make a
conveyance of his title to Dill.
Appeal dismissed.

JAMES vs. DOBSON.
Assumpsit-Contractof suretyship-urety
cannot be held liable on a parolpromise
to discharge the debt of another-Act of
April 26, 1855.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Brown applied to Peter James
for a loan of one thousand dollars, and
stated that he would give William Dobson
as his surety. Subsequently, James saw
Dobson and stated to him what Brown
had told him. Dobson replied that he
should make the loan and he would sign
the note of Brown as a surety. The loan
was made on the faith of the promise made
by Dobson to become surety, and a note
taken by James from Brown dated April
1, 1902, and payable to him on April 1,
1903, with interest from date. On July 1,
1902, James presented the note to Dobson
and requested him to sign as surety, which
lie refused. At maturity of note Brown
had become insolvent and James sues Dobson for the amount due on the note. These
facts being agreed upon the plaintiff asks
for judgment.
BRADDOCK and HEDGES for the plaintiff.
The contract. was with Dobson primarily, and he is liable. This remnovesitfront
the statute of frauds. Clark on Contracts,
page 95.
If a person says I will see that you are

paid, it is not within the statute of frauds.
Nelson v. Bturton, 3 Met. 396; Zaston v.
Farr, 148 Pa. 220.
LAUB and Si.rzEi for defendant.

A contract of suretyship ninst be in writing. Wilson v. Martin, 74 P.. 159.
The Act of April 26, 1855, forbids the admission cf parol evidence to prove a coiltract of surety. Schaefer v. Bank, 59 Pa.
144 ; MIurray v. McKee, 60 Pa. 3.5.
A parol promise to indorse the note of
another is within the statute.
Der v.
Downs, 57 Iowa 589; Carville v. Crane, 5
Hill 484; Miller v. Long, 45 Pa. 350.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Under the Act of April 26, 18.55, P. &L.
308, par. 1, providing that: "No action
shall he brought whereby to charge any
executor oradiiiini.3trator, upon any promise to answer damages out of his own estate, or whereby to charge the defendant,
upon any special promise, to answer for
the debt or default of another, unless the
agreement upon which such action should
be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall 'be in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or sonle
other person by him authorized ;" I do
not think that the plaintiff can recover in
this action.
Construing the statute strictly I would
contend that when a party promises to act
as surety without any written agreement,
he cannot be held liable, and the contract
will not be enforceable.
A parol contract of guarantee that a
third party will pay his note is not enforceable. Miller v. Long, 45 Pa. 350;
Jack v. Morrison, 48 Pa. 113; Allwine v.
Garberick, 8 Phila. 637.
An indorsement is not such a note in
writing as is required by the statute, and
proof of a collateral liability for the debt
of the maker, different from that which
the indorsement imports, cannot be made
by parol. Murray v. McKee, 60 Pa. 35;
Schafer v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank
of Easton, 59 Pa. 144; Slack v. Kirk, 67
Pa. 380; Eilbert v. Finkhehner, 68 Pa. 243.
When the validity of a contract depends
upon its being in writing, it can be proved
only by writin.g. Miller v. Fichthome,
31 Pa. 252; Marlin v. Duffey, 4 Phila. 75;
Kelley v. Watson, 1 W. N. C. 6.
A verbal promise by an executor to pay
a legacy, or on the mere consideration of
assets, does not make him personally liable.
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Okison's Appeal, 59 Pa. 99; Smith v. Carroll, 112 Pa. 390.
This statute has been copied from the
English Statute of Frauds and Perjuries,
and has long since vindicated itself as a
salutary rule of law. To take away this
temptation to perjury, he who is sued for
the debt of another, has a right to demand
written evidence of his promise.
In the case of Dee v. Downs, .57 Iowa
589, which is directly to the point, itwas
held that where one agreed to execute a
note as surety for another, such an agreement is a promise to answer for the debt
or defaultof that other, and is within the
Statute of Frauds unless the agreement is
in writing.
De Colyer's Law of Guaranties, Principal and Surety, page 39, in referring to
operation of the Statute of Frauds, says:
"That it is obvious that a promise to give
a guarantee at a future time entirely falls
within the mischief which the enactment
was intdended to guard against, and indeed,
that if the statute could be avoided by
making such 1 promise it would be useless."
In the case at bar the claim being for the
debt of another, the defendant having not
signed, nor directed any one to sign as is
required by the Statute of Frauds, he is
not liable.' There is no promise in writing
by Dobson, and, therefore, no promissory
note by him, and no valid promise to pay
the debt of another, and consequently
judgment must be rendered in favor of the
defendant.

CARLIN, 3.
OPINION OF TIE

SUPREME COURT.

Dobson told James that if he made the
loan to Brown, he, Dobson, "would sign
the note of Brown as a surety." He did
not borrow the money himself and direct
it to be paid to Brown. Nor did he affect
to borrow it as a joint principal with
Brown. James understood hini to promise, and he in fact promised, to become
surety by signing the note
If he had said that lie would be surety
if the money wasloaned,thestatuteoffrauds
would make the assumption unenforcible.
Surely no greater effect can be attributed
to an oral promise to become surety by
signing the note.
It is true that James was beguiled into
parting with his money by Dobson's promise, and that it is very like a fraud for Dob-

187

son now to repudiate his promise. But
the law chooses between more and fewer
frauds, and between frauds on the alleged
creditor and frauds on the alleged collateral debtor. The English parliament and
the legislatures of various American states
have deemed it preferable to endure frauds
of persons offering orally to become sureties, than to endure frauds of creditors,
alleging that they become such in reliance
on oral proffers from sureties. It is unavoidable that the statute designed to preyen t one set of frauds should nmake another
set possible.
Judgment affirmed.

ESTATE OF SAMUEL TALIAFERO.
Exeeutor's liability on investment of trust
* funds-Duty on cestui que trust to elect
to take profits of investment or interest.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Pope, executor, whose duty it was
to invest the personalty ($20,000) used it
in a business of his own. For four years
the profits he made on the money represented by his business was nine per cent.
The next three years it was seven per
cent. The next-five years it. was but two
per cent., and the two following years
there was a loss of twelve per cent. on the
capital invested. Pope filed an account.
The cestui que trumst claimed that he
should be surcharged with the percentage
got by him the first seven years and with
six per cent. on the $20,000 for the other
years.
The trustee contends that lie should account for six per cent. for all the years,
or for the average profits of all the years.
I8ETZER attorney for exceptants.
Where a trustee speculates with trust
funds in his own business he may be held
for profits if successful, and interest if the
investment is disastrous. Norris' Appeal,
71 Pa. 106; Deal's Estate, 18 Phila. 188;
Thomnpson's Estate, 18 Phila. 63; Robinet's
Appeal, 12 Casey 174; Williamson's Estate,
18 W. N. C. 138; Ishmnen's Appeal, 43 Pa.
431.
Executor must pay legal interest on
trust funds. Act lar. 29, 1832; Verner's
Estate, 6 Watts 250; Dyott's Estate, 2 XW.
& S. 505; Whitaker v. Peek, 4 Kulp 320.
MENGES attorney for executor.
Interest chargeable to the executor shall
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not exceed the legal rate. Act Mar. 29,
1832-; Heckert's Appeal, 24 Pa. 482; Coin.
v. Lintner, 8 Lanc. Bar 25.
The cestui trust may accept either profits
or interest but.not both. Robinett's Appeal, 36 Pa. 174; Gilbert's Appeal, 78 Pa.
226; Segurn's Appeal, 103 Pa. 139; Small's
Estate, 144 Pa. 293; Sharp's Estate, 2
Phila. 280.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first question in this case is: In
what may a trustee invest trust funds in
order that he may not be held liable in
case of failure?
In Pennsylvania, by statute, he may
make such investment in the public debt
of the U. S., of the State, of Philadelphia,
in real securities, county bonds, city bonds,
and in school district or municipal bonds.
Act of 1876, P. & L. C. 3334, and by Act
of 1854, in ground rents; by the Act of
1870, in bonds of the Pa. R. R., and by
Act of 1872 the same privilege was extended to investments in bonds of the
P. & R. The executor may, however, be
authorized by the testator to invest in
other securities, but he, the executor, must
establish such authority with the utmost
clearness, Barker's Est., 159 Pa. 528. And,
in Pennsylvania unless there be a discretionary authority as to the investment of
trust funds even the legislature cannot
authorize such investment in the bonds
or stock of a private corporation. Constitution of 1874, art. III, sec. XXII.
The authority to invest the trust funds
in personal security was not authorized
by statute and it does not appear that he
was given such authority by the testator,
and where neither appears the executor
must bear the loss for such investment.
Angue's Estate, 2 Phila. 137; Baker's
Appeal, 18 Pa. 303.
The next question is, must the executor
account for the profits? Pope, the executor, contends that he may pay interest
and retain the profits, or that he may turn
over the profits and be exempt from the
payment of any interest. The money on
which Pope, as executor, made a profit for
the first seven years belonged to the cestui
que trust and we do not see how theexecutor can use the trust funds in an investment not expressly authorized by
testator or not sanctioned by statute, and
then claim the profits. The executor, as
trustee, holds the legal title for the use of
the cestui que trust, and when there are

profits or accretions the legal title to such
vests in the trustee for the use of the
cestui que trust. He being the bare custodian of such fund for another we think
he must account for the profits. Habeman's Appeal, 111 Pa. 329; Norris' Appeal, 71 Pa. 106; Hermstead's Appeal, 60
Pa. 423; Baker's Appeal, 120 Pa. 33; Kepler
& Davis, 80 Pa. 153; Oswald's Appeal, 3
Grant 300.
The next question is, did the trustee
use sufficient care and prudence in making the investment to exempt him from
the payment of interest for the five years
in which the investment was disastrous?
When the trustee invests in a manner
unauthorized by statute or the testator,
no matter how good his intentions were;
he is liable to removal, interest on the
fund, to make good the principal lost and
to a criminal prosecution for embezzlement. Drake's Est., 2 Kulp 256.
The simple fact that he acted in good
faith and that other prudent investors
have bought the same securities is immaterial. Ishmen's Appeal, 43 Pa. 431;
Barker's Appeal, 159 Pa. 518.
In view of the law as stated we think
Pope, the executor, should turn over the
profits to the cestui que trust and pay interest at 6 per cent. for the unsuccessful
years.
Fox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The learned court below has properly
decided that the executor had no right to
invest the trust money in his business.
He has, however, done so. The question
is, what should he pay, profits or interest;
and further, can he be compelled to pay
profits for the years during which profits
were earned, and interest for the years during which profits equal to six per cent.
were not earned? The option is with the
cestui que trust, to demand the profits or
the interest. He will, on the settlement of
the account, ascertain which of them it
would be to his advantage to claim. But,
why should profits for one period and interest for another, be claimable? By demanding the profits, the cestui que trust
ratifies the investment, as a unit, and precludes himself from repudiating it for a
portion of the period. If great profits were
made for two months, and then heavy
losses for the remaining ten months of a
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year, could the profits for the formerlperiod
and the interest for the latter be demanded?
But the distinction of months is no more
arbitrary than that of years. It will
scarcely be contended that if the result of
a year's operations is a profit of only two
per cent. the cestui que trust could claim
six per cent. on his fund for the ten months
during which there was a loss, and at tie
same time claim 15 or 20 per cent. profit
during the six weeks or two months of the
year during which such profits were made.
The exceptant should have considered the
product of the investment as a totality,
and, finding the interest on the fund, at
six per cent. for 14 years, to be greater than
the average profits for the 14 years, he
should have elected to take interest. He
cannot divide the period of investment
into two portions, that in which the
profits exceed six per cent. and that in
which they are less than six per cent. and
elect to take the profits for the former and
the interest forthe latter. Small's Estate,
144 Pa. 293; Sharp's Estate, 2 Phila. 280;
Guardians, 239.
Decree reversed with procedendo.

DAY vs. LOGAN.
Bankruptcy-National bankruptcy act
1898-Preference-Knowledge of insolvency-Affidavit of defense-Sec. 60
(a) and (b) construed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Logan, a creditor of John Jiller, obtained
judgment, issued execution and collected
the debt, viz: $1,000. Two months after
the execution sale Jiller petitioned in
bankruptcy. He was in due course adjudged a bankrupt. Day was appointed
trustee. He sues Logan to recover the
valueof thegoods taken inexecotion which
was $l.150. If he cannot recover this, he
wishes to recover $1,000, the price at which
they sold. The evidence shows that
Logan knew when he got his judgment
that Jiller was insolvent; that Jiller likewise knew it; that Logan intended to
prefer himself to other creditors, he obtained judgment, knowing that the other
creditors would not obtain judgment of
their claims.

HUBLER

[89
for plaintiff.

Cited Section 60, Clause a and b, of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

The defendant had reasonable cause to
believe the judgment was intended as a
preference. Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. (U.
S.) 40; Buchanan v. Smith, 16 id. 277;
Wager v. Hall, id. 584; Merchants' Nat.
Bank v. Cook, 95 U. S. 342; Mundo v.
Shepard et al, 166 Mass. 323.
LOURIT6ER for defendant.
Lack of knowledge upon the part of the
defendant of the insolvency of the bankrupt, and reasonable cause to believe the
transaction was not intended to create a
preference, is a good defense. Gamble v.
Elkin, 205 Pa. 226; cited also Furth v.
Stahl, 205 Pa. 439; Trust Company v.
Roebling, 107 Fed. Rep. 71.
OPINION OF 'THE COURT.

Logan, a creditor of Jiller, obtained a
judgment against the latter, issued execution, and collected his debt. Two months
afterward Jiller filed a petition in bankrupty, was adjudged a bankrupt, and the
plaintiff, Day, appointed trustee. Proceedings were instituted by Day, alleging that
the judgment was a preference, and voidable by action of the trustee, because it
was in violation of Section 60, a and b,of
the National Bankruptcy Act, which reads
as follows :
"a. A person shall be deemed to have
given a preference if, being insolvent, he
has, within four months before the filing
of the petition

*

*

*

*

procured or

suffered a judgment to be entered against
himself in favor of any person
*
*
* and the effect of the enforcement of
such judgment or transfer will be to enable
any one of his creditors to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than any other of
such creditors of the same class."
"b. If a bankrupt shall have given a
preference, and the person receiving it *
*

*

*

shall have reasonable cause to

believe that it was intended thereby to
give a preference, it shall be voidable by
the trustee, and he may recover the property, or its value, from such person."
The testimony adduced at the trial of
the case showed that both the defendant
and the bankrupt knew of the latter's insolvency, and that Logan, the defendant,
also intended to prefer himself to other
creditors.
There can be no dispute but that the
facts bring the case within the meaning of
Section 60, subd. a, of the act. But whether
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or not it is within the purview of subd. b
-ofthe same section is very doubtful.
This subdivision provides that the trustee may recover "if the person receiving it
(preference) shall have had reasonable
cause to believe it was intended thereby to
give a preference."
What is the true meaning of this phrase
in the act?
Necessarily it presupposes an intention
on the part of the insolvent, together with
acts sufficient, that the party preferred
may be charged with having reasonable
cause to believe a preference was intended.
Applying these principles to the case at
bar, what do we find? Logan knew that
Jiller was insolvent. Knowledge of one's
insolvency, unless accompanied by a positive act on the part of the insolvent, is not
evidence sufficient to charge a person with
having reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended. The requirement of
the bankruptcy law is not that the preferred person should have reasonable cause
to believe that the bankrupt was insolvent,
but that a preference was intended. Crawford, trustee, v. Rumpf, 205 Pa. 154. A
person may be insolvent and yet not have
an intention to prefer a certain creditor
when an adverse judgment is entered
against him. He may have exactly the
opposite intention. For these reasons we
believe bare knowledge of Jiller's insol';eucy does not bringthe defendant within
the meaning of subdivision b, section 60.
Neither do we think Jiller's consciousness of his embarrassed condition, nor Logan's intention to prefer himself, affect the
determination of the case.
The essential poipt is, whether Logan
had reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended.
The law presumes that transactions of
this character are legal, and the burden of
proof is on the trustee to overcome this
presumption. Keith v. Gettysburg Nat.
Bank, 23 Sup. 14; Netter v. Refwirch, 12
Dist. 196. The trustee must show some
positive act on the part of the insolvent
which would induce the ordinary man to
believe a preference was intended. A very
slight affirmative act would be sufficient,
such as facilitating the entry of a judgment, etc. Whether or not Jiller resisted
the entry of the judgment does not appear.
But assuming that he had no defence, and

remained passively indifferent, would this
be sufficient? We think not. Heowed a
just debt, he had no defence, and he made
none. To have made an effort by dilatory
or false pleas to delay judgment would not
only have been a moral wrong, but a fraud
in law. And the law would not sanction
it, much less compel itAgain, it is argued that a legal duty is
imposed on an insolvent, when sued by a
creditor in a proceeding likely to end in
judgment and seizure of property, to file
himself a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and that failure to so do implies
an intent to prefer. No statute places this
duty on an insolvent, and certainly there
is no moral obligation on his part to so do.
Many business men find themselves technically insolvent, yet by the forbearance
of creditors, and by energetic action, are
able to again place themselves on a solid
financial basis. Under the Bankruptcy
Act a person is deemed insolvent when his
debts exceed the aggregate of his property.
A very serious injustice would be worked
if it were held that a person against whom
a judgment was entered, and whose debts
exceeded his assets, however little, incurred a legal or moral duty to go into
bankruptcy. Suppose a merchant discovers that the'aggregate of his property
at a fair valuation is less by $5.00 than the
amount of his liabilities. The following
day ajudgment is recovered against him
for $5.00. He is, according to the act, insolvent. And, if the above theory be correct,
it would be his duty to immediately file a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and
have all his property taken from him,
when if given a little time he would have
been able to meet all his debts. We think
the argument is without foundation.
We therefore reach the conclusion that
the insolvency of Jiller, known to both
himself and Logan, together with the fact
that Logan, in obtaining judgment, intended to prefer himself to other creditors,
is insufficient to charge the defendant with
having reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended, and further, that it is
insufficient to submit to the jury. Keith
v. Gettysburg National Bank, 23 Sup. 14.
We therefore direct the jury to render a
verdict in favor of the defendant.
PAUL WILLIS, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREMNIE COURT.

This is an action by the trustee in
bankruptcy, to recover money collected by
an execution. The judgment was obtained (in intilhun, we must assume), when
Jiller, the defendant, was insolvent, and
when both Logan, the plaintiff, and he
knew that he was insolvent. Logan and
Jiller knew that there were other creditors; the former intended to prefer himself
to them, both when he obtained the judgment and when he caused the sale.
The obtaining of the judgment and the
issue of the execution, Jiller not having at
least five days before the sale, vacated or
discharged the preference secured by them,
was an act of bankruptcy. The defendant
"suffers or permits" the creditor to obtain
a preference, when, without any co-operation of his, the judgment is obtained and
the execution issued. In Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, a warrant of attorney
was given in 1885, thirteen years before
the passage of the Bankrupt Act of 1898.
Judgment was entered on it Nov. 21, 1898,
without any co-operation of the defendant.
When the warrant was given, he was
solvent. Re had become insolvent. He
could do nothing to prevent, and he did
nothing to induce or assist the plaintiff to
enter the judgment. It was held, however, that the entry of the judgment, etc.,
was a suffering or permitting, while the
debtor was insolvent, the creditor to obtain
a preference, and was an act of bankruptcy,
under the third section of chapter III of
the bankrupt act.
The 60th section of this act states that a
person shalt be deemed to have given a
preference, if being insolvent he has,
within four months before the filing of the
petition * * * procured or suffered a
judgment to be entered against himself
*
and the effect of such judgment
*
*will
be to enable any one of his
creditors to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than any other of such creditors
of the same class. "Suffer," in this clause,
can scarcely mean other than it means in
section 3.
Section 60 provides for the avoidance of
the preference. It is.necessary in order to
avoid it, that the person receiving it * *
* "shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give
a preference."
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An act may be one which justifies tile
sequestration of the debtors property; that
is, it may be an act of bankruptcy, although the effect of the act with respect
to another person, will not be annulled.
Peck v. Connell, 21 Super 22. The mere
passive or active suffering the recovery of
a judgment may be sufficient to support
proceedings in bankruptcy, although the
plaintiff therein may not be deprived of
the judgment, or of the payment of his
debt, effected by means of an execution
based upon it. Though, by section 3, the
recovery of the judgment is alone an act
of bankruptcy, there must in addition
be al intent to give a preference, and
reasonable cause for the creditor's believing
in tile existence of this intention, in order
to justify the deprivation of the creditor of
the fruits of the judgment and execution.
Literally interpreted, the 60th section
seems torequire al intention in the debtor
to give a preference, and reasonable cause
for the creditor's believing in the existence
of this intention. We are of opinion that
this strict interpretation is not to be
made. The question is, shall the creditor
lose an advantage? His own intention
would seem to be more relevant than that
of the debtor. If he has the intention to
take a preference, and if he, in fact, takes it,
why should he be allowed to retain it, because the debtor did not intend it? Is it
not as reprehensible for the creditor to intend to take a preference, as for the debtor
to give one? And will not preference be
procured in a large number of cases, no
less in consequence of the intention of the
creditor than of the debtor? The 60th
section evidently contemplates that the
mere existence of the debtor's intention
shall not be enough to render voidable the
preference. The creditor's participation
in it is contemplated by the condition that
the creditor shall "have reasonable cause
to believe" it. His belief is inferred from
his having had reasonable cause to believe.
The intention of the debtor alone, then,
does not imperil the preference. Conjoined
with it, must be that of the creditor, for if
the creditor believes that the debtor intends to prefer him, the creditor must intend, in accepting it, the same preference
that the debtor intends. There is no visible reason while annulling a preference
intended by both parties, for not annul-
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ling a preference intended only by the
party who gains it.
But, the preference is gained, not barely
by the entry of the judgment, but by its
being allowed to stand; by the execution
that issues on it, and the sale that is
effected under it. Does not the debtor,
knowing that the creditor has obtained
the judgment, and that a preference must
result from it, intend this preference when
he refrains from causing it to be "vacated
or discharged" at least five days before the
sale? If he can vacate itin no other way,
he can do it by resorting to voluntary
bankruptcy. Remarking that the debtor
did not, within five days before the sale,
vacate or discharge the preference, "or file
a petition in bankruptcy," Gray, J., observes in Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191:
"By failing to do so, he confessed that he
was hopelessly insolvent, and consented
to the preference that he failed to vacate."
When one "consents" to a preference
which he can avoid he is not far from "intending" it.
We are of the opinion that from the
facts disclosed in the court below, it is sufficiently evident that Jiller was insolvent
when the judgment was recovered, that
he in suffering that judgment to be recovered, or in suffering his property to
remain accessible to executions issued
upon it, intended that Logan should be
paid before other creditors, that Logan
not only had "reasonable cause to believe"
but did believe that this was his intention,
and that the preference is therefore voidable. Peck v. Connell, 21 Super 22, is not
distinctly contra.
The goods levied on were worth $1,150.
They sold at the execution sale for only
$1,000. The title of the purchaser cannot
be assailed. It does not appear that Logan
became the purchaser. The recovery allowed by the 60th section of the act of
1898 is of "the property or its value from
such person," that is, from Logan. No
recourse can be had to the sheriff's vendee
if he is other than Logan. The trustee is
entitled to recover the "value" of the
property. In tie absence of other evidence,
the price obtained at a judicial sale will
be assumed to represent the "value" of the
things sold, but as experience abundantly
shows, it may be in fact much less. It is
affirmatively found in the court below,

that the value of the goods sold was $150
more than the price secured. The accepting and enforcing a preference was !inproper, and there is no hardship in obliging the creditor to replace what he has
caused to be sold or its value, i. e., what
the trustee could obtain from it, did he
find it among the assets. What the inferiority of the price obtained at the execution sale to the value, was due to, does not
appear. We cannot assume that the price
at a trustee sale would have been equally
inferior to the actual value.
Despite the clear and forcible opinion of
the learned court below, by which its
judgment is fortified, we find it necessary
to come to a different conclusion. Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.

PENNA. COAL CO. vs. TROY R. R.
COMPANY.
Corporations- Ditra vires contracts-A
creditorentering an ultravires contract
knowingly and which was executed in
whole or in part may enforce it against
the corporation-Such a debt is to rank
as any other debt in the distribution oJ"
the funds of an insolvent corporation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The Troy R. R. Company was chartered
to carry passengers and freight. In order
to increase the business of the corporations
it entered into a contract by which it
leased iron mines and a furnace, and
operated the same. It purchased for fuel
for this purpose 1,000 tons of anthracite
coal from the Penn. Coal Co. for $4,000,
who was aware of what it was to be used
for. The operation of the furnance proved
a losing operation, and not enough was
realized to pay the necessary outlay. The
railroad company became insolvent, its
property was sold under judicial proceedings. The amount realized for the same
was $200,000. The indebtedness for equipment, cars, engines, rails, ties and operating expenses amounts to $210,000. The
Penn. Coal Co. claim to participate in the
distribution of the fund, which is resisted
by the creditors to whom the moneys are
due for cars, etc. Shall the auditor allow
a pro rata to its claim, or distribute the
whole fund to the others?
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MOREHOUSE for plaintiff.

A corporation may not avail itself of the
defense of ultravires when a contract has
been executed by theother party. Schurr
v. N. Y. Investment Co., 18 N. Y. Supp.
454. Such a contract is enforceable where
plaintiff has performed. Oil Co. v. Transportation Co., 83 Pa. 160; Insurance Co. v.
Browuback & Co., 1 Superior 183; Coal
Co. v. Rodgers, 108 Pa. 147. This, also,
where plaintiff had knowledge of ultra
vire9 nature of the contract. Parrish v.
Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494. The contract being enforceable, the claim must be allowed.
PRICKETT for defendant.

The fact that a contract will be beneficial to a corporation does not authorize the
corporation to make it, if it is ultra vires.
Davis v. Old Colony Rt. R. Co., 131 Mass.
2.58; People v. Campbell, 144 N. Y. 166;
Dresser v. Traders' National Bank, 165
Mass. 120. A corporation is not liable on
an ultra vires contract. Mr. Justice Gray,
in 131 U. S. 371. This question is not between the original parties to the contract,
but by a creditor on an ultravirescontract,
which ultra vires business resulted in the
insolvency of the corporation, as against
those whose claims resulted legitimately.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It appears from the facts before the court
that the Troy Rt. R. Co. was chartered to
carry passengers and freight. In order to
increase the business of the corporation, it
entered into a contract by which it leased
iron mines and a furnace, and operated the
same. It purchased for fuel for this purpose 1,000 tons of anthracite coal from the
Pennsylvania Coal Co., for $4,000, who
was aware of what it was to be used for.
The operation of the furnace proved a losing operation, and not enough was realized
to pay the necessary outlay. The R. R.
Co. became insolvent, its property was sold
under judicial proceedings. The amount
realized for the same was $200,000. The
indebtedness for equipment, cars, engines,
rails, ties and operating expenses amounts
to $210,009.
The Pennsylvania Coal Co. claim to participate in the distribution of the fund,
which is resisted by the creditors to whom
the moneys are due for cars, etc., and the
question which is brought before the court
is, shall the auditor allow a pro ratato its
claim, or distribute the whole fund to the
others?
It seems that it may be stated as a rule
in Pennsylvania, that as between the corporation and a creditor on an ultra vires
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contract, wlich has been partly performed
and the corporation has received the benefits, it is estopped from setting up the defense, in an action for the consideration
against it, that the contract was beyond
the authority, and, therefore, it is not liable. 83 Pa. 160; 128 Pa. 110; 122 Pa. 565.
For instance, in Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co.
v. Shaw, it is held, that although it may
be ultra vires for a railroad company to
maintain a telegraph line, yet this will be
no defense to an action by its contractor
for compensation under a contract for
building the line. And again, it is held
in 137 N. Y. 417, that if a corporation engages in a business not in itself unlawful
or wrongful as against the State or the
public, and while engaged in this business
incurs an obligation to a third person,
which would be good against it if it had
power to engage in that business, it will
not be heard to set up the plea of ultravires
when sued to enforce that obligation.
It was argued by the plaintiff that the
leasing ofthe furnace, and operation of it,
were necessary aid to the railroad, and as
the facts state, also to increase the business of the corporation, and therefore the
contract was not ultraviresbut if you concede this power to it you at once give to it
the authority under this pretekt to erect
manufacturing establishments, etc., and
enter recklessly into unlimited field of enterprises, which were never contemplated
by the Legislature or by its shareholders,
and which is in no sense a legitimate incident to its actual express authority.
But in the present case thecircumstances
are different; it is not the corporation
which is claiming that the contract was
ultravires; it is the creditors of the corporation under contracts made while the
corporation was acting within its authority. There seems to be no decision in this
State on this point, but it has been held,
in Bank of Chattanooga v. Bank of Memphis, that as between the creditois of an
insolvent bank, those whose debts were
created under a lawful power, given by
the charter, must be preferred to those who
claim under a contract that the bank, under its charter, had no power to make. In
such case the bank is not estopped from
denying the illegality or want of power to
make the contract. 9 Heisk (Tenn.) 408.
Do the creditors under valid contracts
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stand in exactly the same plade as the corporation itself, which is estopped from setting up the plea of ultra vires? We think
they do not, because they were undoubtedly innocent, and could not prevent the
corporation from entering into the ultra
vires contract with the Pennsylvania Coal
Co., who were chargeable with the knowledge of the ultravires business of the railroad company.
The court is, therefore, of the opinion
that it would be doing a great injustice in
the present case to allow the creditors under the ultra vires contract to come in and
sharepro ratawith the other creditors.
Judgment for the defendant.
R. A. HUBLER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREAE COURT.

We are not able to reach the conclusion
arrived at by the learned Court of Common
Pleas.
The railroad company had, it is true, no
authority to conduct the business of manufacturing iron, and executory contracts
between it and others, known by the latter to be made in the prosecution of the
illegitimate business, would not be specifically enforced, nor would damages for the
non-fulfillment of them, be recoverable.
Bossbardtv. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. 109;
Wilmington & Reading R. R. v. Berks
County Railroad, 6 W. N. C. 115; Culver
v. Reno Real Estate Co., 91 Pa. 367.
If, however, the other party has performed in whole or in part, he is entitled
to recover the contractual consideration,
or an equitable part of it. Oil Creek & A.
R.R. v. Penna. Transportation Co., 83 Pa.
160; Wright v. Antwerp Pipe Line Co.,
101 Pa. 204; Boyd v. American Carbon
Black Co., 182 Pa. 206.
The Penn. Coal Co. has sold and delivered 1,000 tons of coal to the railroad
company, which owes it therefor $4,000.
The learned court below concedes that the
coal company may compel the corporation
to pay it, if it has available assets. It
holds, however, that none of its assets are
available until the debt originating in
transactions pertaining to the proper business of transportation, have been paid in
full.
It does xAot appear from what property
the assets for distribution have been obtained. While the operation of the fur-

nace was a losing one, it is not shown that
that of the railroad itself, was more profitable. Perhaps the furnace business was
less unprofitable than that of transportation. If the illegitimate business had been
profitable, would the creditors of the corporation consent that such of them as
dealt with it, with respect to the furnace,
should be paid in preference to themselves
out of so much of the assets as represented
the profits made?
The business of conducting a furnace is
rather public. It would be difficult to believe that creditors might not be aware of
it. It is not found that the general creditors were ignorant of it. The principle is
well established that one who becomes a
creditor with knowledge of the illegitimate
purchase by the corporation, of shares of
its stock, cannot assail the validity of the
purchase, and make the vendor of the
stock liable to him. No act can be more
ultra vires than that, from the standpoint
of the law of many jurisdictions. It
would be difficult to justify the doctrine
that a creditor knowing when he becomes
such, that the corporation is engaged in
an ultravires business, may have debts
arising therefrom, declared, so far as he is
concerned, invalid.
Differences among creditors with regard
to preference in payment, may exist as the
result of well ascertained liejas. In this
case the attempt is made to classify debts in
respect to their meritoriousness, or legality.
The law refuses, generally, to inquire into
the meritoriousness of the debts. It distinguishes not between debts springing
from contracts or from judgments founded
on torts; loans of money from a halfbenevolent intention to help the corporation, and debts contracted with no altruistic complexion; late debts and earlier
debts. We see no sufficient reason to consider the classes of business, and to distinguish the debts springing from them
respectively. When the law has said that
the creditor in an ultravires contract, may
enforce it against the corporation, it has
practically said that it is to rank as other
debts.
We have already suggested that the illegitimate business might be profitable and
the legitimate unprofitable. The larger
part of the assets for distribution might be
the product of the illegitimate business.
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If in the actual case, the ultravires creditors should be postponed to the legitimates,
in the casejust supposed, the former should
be preferred to the latter. No court, it is
probable, is ready to take that position,
We have found no trace of the disposition, while giving validity to a debt as
against the corporation, to stigmatize and
disfranchise it, as respects other creditors
except in the case from Tennessee, cited
by the learned court below, access to
which we have not had. We are not able
to follow its lead, if it teaches what it is
understood to teach, by the Court of Common Pleas. The learned court suggests
that creditors could not prevent the corporation from entering into ultra vires
contracts, and therefore should not be
bound by them because the corporation is.
But, if they are to be permitted to obtain a
preference over ultra vires creditors, it
might be better to allow them to intervene
in the affairs of the corporation, in order
to prevent the making of illegitimate contracts. Unwise, preposterous and ruinous
contracts, within their powers, are often
made by corporations. Are we to say that
the creditors in wise contracts, are to be
allowed to claim a preference over those
in unwise ones, because they cannot prevent the making of the unwise ones?
Decree reversed. The fund will be distributed pro rata among the creditors.

made, he tendered back his remaining
soap and insisted on his exemption front
any duty to pay. This is assunpsit for
$400. The plaintiff contending contract
prohibiting sale to others was void. That
it was penalty and not liquidated
damnages.
SPENCER attorney for plaintiff.
Contracts in restraint of trade are not
sustained by the courts.
Conipus v.
Rochester, 56 Pa. 194; Hardinson's Appeal, 78 Pa. 196; Kuler v. Taylor, 53 Pa.
467; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal
Co., 68 Pa. 173.
Whether a sum mentioned in an agreement to be paid for nonfulfillment of the
contract is a penalty or liquidated damages is a question for the Court-and
judgment must follow the decision.
Bigony v. Tyson, 75 Pa. 157; Teumnreth v.
Mauser, 12 Phila. 366; Graham v. Bickham, 2 Yeates 32.
LONG attorney for defendant.
Where contract in redtrainer of trade is
partial, reasonable and founded upon a
consideration it is valid and will be enforced. A. & E. Enc., vol. 3, page 882,
see. 52; Hall's Appeal, 60 Pa. 458; Morris
Run C. Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa.
173; McCiurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 51; Sompers
v. Rochester, 56 Pa. 194; Fullers v. Hope,
163 Pa. 62.
An agreement "to forfeit and pay" a
definite sum on the happening of a certain event naturally imports that sum is
liquidated damage and not a penalty.
Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. 450; Malone
v. Phila., 147 Pa. 416; Clemens v. R. R.,
132 Pa. 445; Matthews v. Sharp, 99 Pa.
560; Kelso v. Reil, 145 Pa. 606.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

THE TOILET ARTICLE CO. vs. JOHN
AKERS.
Contracts in restraint qf trade-Liquidated damages and penaliesfor breach
of contract discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Akers, a druggist, agreed to take $400
worth of fancy soaps from the plaintiff,
providing that should the latter sell soaps
to any other druggist in the county, he,
Akers, should be allowed to return such
soaps as he had not already sold, and be
relieved from paying for those sold. The
company, two wepks later, sold $25 worth
of soaps to another druggist in the county,
but twelve miles distant. Within that
time Akers had sold $200 worth of his
soap. When demand for the $400 was

In order that the plaintiff recover in
this case it is necessary that the contract
was void as being illegally in restraint of
trade, or that the sum forfeited was a
penalty and not liquidated damages.
A fundamental principle of the law of
contracts is that a restraint is not unreasonable if it is founded on a valuable
consideration, and is reasonably necessary
to protect the interest of the party in
whose favor it is imposed, and does not
unduly prejudice the interests of the
public. Clark on Contracts, p. 446, .195;
110 Pa. 3; 56 Pa. 194; 68 Pa. 173; 9 W. N.
C. 272; 113 Pa. 579; 58 Pa. 51; 53 Pa. 467.
The restraint in this case was reasonable.
The extent of it was over a single county
only. In order to induce the defendant
to purchase such a quantity of soaps, he
must have been persuaded by such inducement as the inference is that his
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business was a large one locally and the
plaintiff was unusually anxious to have
him handle their goods. Such inference
gathers weight from the fact that the
Toilet Article Co. afterwards sold $25
worth of soap to a druggist but twelve
miles distant. If they were desirous of
making such a small sale comparatively
at a short distance from the defendant's
place of business, a fortiori, they must
have been very insistentin their endeavors
to persuade the defendant to handle their
goods. Thus they made a contract with
him which was to compensate him in
case violation of it occurred. To permit
them, now, to recover on the ground that
it was a contract illegally in restraint of
trade would be to approve bad faith on
their part. They are compelled to act in
good faith.
Good faith requires of a party who has
sold the good will of his business, that she
should do nothing which tends to deprive
the purchaser of its benefits and advantages. 60 Pa. 458.
The second contention of the plaintiff
company demands more serious consideration. Was the forfeiture a penalty or
liquidated damages? No general rule is
laid down by which to govern all cases as
to what is to be regarded as a penalty and
what liquidated damages. Hence, to determine whether a stipulated sum named
in an agreement as a forfeiture for failure
of compliance is intended as a penalty or
as liquidated damages, it is necessary to
look at the language of the contract, its
subject matter, the intention of the parties
as gathered from all its provisions, the ease
or difficulty in measuring the breach in
damages, and amount stipulated for; and
from the whole to gather the view which
equity and good conscience require should
be taken of the case. 48 Pa. 458: 99 Pa.
560; 145 Pa. 106; 132 Pa. 445; 189 Pa. 198;
We think this case, as
200 Pa. 249.
measured by the adjudications laid down
in the above cases, warrants the decision
that the forfeiture in this case was intended as liquidated damages and not as a
penalty. By the contract Akers was to
take $400 worth of fancy soaps. A druggist who can make such heavy purchases
of such articles must enjoy a very thriving
trade, and must be one with whom any
business firm would be quite desirous of

dealing. His sales of other like articles
would necessarily be large and to warrant
his purchase of this amount from the
plaintiff firm would mean a sacrifice on
his part of efforts to dispose of other
brands and of an accompanying inconvenience experienced in persuading his
customers to buy this particular brand.
To persuade Akers to buy, the Toilet
Article Co., as a recompense for the extra
labor, agreed to sell no other of their product to dealers in the same county. This
extra inducement, we think, was necessary, and under the circumstances was a
guarantee, the breach of which was in a
small way only repaired by the returning
of the unsold articles and a retention of
the value of the amount sold. We presume this brand of soaps was not handled
by Akers previous to making this contract. Such presumption is based on a
fair interpretation of the facts of the case.
If it was, the sales of them were small and
the plaintiff made an extraordinary contract to increase them. In either case the
company was greatly benefited, and to
allow their contention would impose a
hardship upon the defendant, contrary to
equity and good conscience and to the
spirit of justice of the law.
The difficulty encountered in measuring
the damages suffered by the defendant by
the subsequent violation of the contract
by the plaintiff company further justifies
our opinion that the forfeit was intended
as liquidated damages. The extra effort
incumbent on Akers to sell this
article, the inconvenience meeting him
in the efforts to induce his customers to
buy this article, the risk of its not being
a salable, staple article, and the danger
of losing trade through such endeavors,
would be lily recompensed by the profits
made upon the article sold. To uphold
the contention that Akers must have anticipated ample reward in such profits and
thus decide the sum named as a penalty,
in our judgment, would be placing an unwarranted construction upon the statement of facts. Applicable to the case before us is therulelaid down in 200 Pa. 249.
Deciding that the contract was not in
restraint of trade, and that the forfeit was
liquidated damages, judgment for the defendant is rendered.
GEORGE E. WOLF, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We are satisfied with the conclusion
reached by the learned court below, in its
lucid and able opinion.
The contract was to pay $400, unless the
vendor should sell to any other druggist.
The condition has been broken on which
the $400 were to be paid, and therefore no
payment can be exacted.
It is suggested that tle contract restrained trade. So it did. But what
would be the result? That the contract
would be void? But the plaintiff asserts
the contract by suing upon it. He surely
cannot agree to sell soap plus exemption from the rivalry of other druggists,
for $400, and collect the $400 for the soap
without the exemption. He may repudiate the contract, but. not at the same
time, claim on it and denounce it as unlawful.
But, such contracts do not unlawfully
restrain trade. As the learned Common
Pleas suggests, the vendee may well agree
to buy for re-sale a certain quantity of an
article, if he is not going to have competition in the re-sale of it, when he would refuse to buy so much, or possibly any, if lie
were going to encounter that competition.
There is really no deprecable restraint
of trade, for if the vendor did not make
the agreement with A not to Qell to B, or
C, or D, he would not sell to A. He agrees
not to sell to one in order that he may sell
to another or in order that he may sell
twice or ten times as much to another.
If there are twenty manufacturers of
an article, each of them may agree
to sell his entire product to X, X in
that way would have a monopoly of the
article. But such agreements are not invalid. They may in certain circumstances
be beneficial, not merely to the parties
(who must be the judges of their own interests), but to the public, of whose interests the courts occasionally constitute
themselves the tutors and saviours. Of.
passim, 24 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 841
et seq.
Judgment affirmed.
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JOHNS, ADMIN., vs. MALOY.
.Death-Survivorship-Presumptionof in
a common disaster one of fact-Burden
of proof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Adam Smith, his wife, Maria, and
their two children, Thomas and Henry,
perished in the recent theatre fire at
Chicago. Smith carried $50,000 worth
of insurance on his life in various companies. All the policies were made payable to his wife as beneficiary with a provision that if he survived his beneficiary
named then payable to his estate. The
companies pay the money into court and
the present contest is among the heirs of
Smith, the heirs of his wife, and the administrator of the children. There is
evidence of Smith's good health and
greatstrength, the robust condition of the
children and the sickly state of the wife at
the time of the fire.
WOLFE for plaintiff.

If there is evidence arising from the age,
sex, or physical condition of the persons
who perished, or from the nature of the
accident and the manner of death of the
parties, which tends to show that some
one did in fact survive the others, the
whole question is one of fact for the jury.
1 Greenleaf (16 Ed.) p. 126 and note. Such
evidence exists in this case. Cited also
Cowen v. Rogers, 10 L. R. A. 550; 1 Barbon, 264.
TYLER for defendant.
There is no presumption of survivorship,
therefore the case must be disposed of as if
it appeared that the parents and children
died simultaneously. Jeffries v. Shillon,
Vol. 7, Forum, p. 227, and cases therein
cited; Cowenan v. Rogers, 10 L. R. A.
550; Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78.
One who claims survivorship must prove
it. Fuller v. Lenzie, 135 Mass. 468; Newell v. Nichols, supra. Cited also, Phila.
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Henrica, 92 Pa. 431.
RENO, J., absent.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The policies were payable to the wife,
in the first instance. They. were payable
to the administrator of Smith, only if
Smith survived her. Where is the burden
of showing this survivorship? Plainly on
Smith's administrator. Has he shown it?
There is evidence that Smith's health
was good, and that he was of great
strength, and that Mrs. Smith was in a
sickly state at the time of the fire. It is
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very evident that to decide that he survived her, would be to decide on a bare
conjecture. There does not necessarily
result from health and strength, a greater
slowness of dying. If he was stronger, he
possibly had a correspondingly greater
strain on him. He was the natural protector of wife and children, and would
exert himself the more severely, or, if
there were any choice of dangerous positions, would probably take the more
dangerous. Weak persons often show a
surprising tenacity of life. We do not
think that from such indecisive evidence
as here presented, any inference could be
drawn by reasonable men, as to which of
the deceased was the last to succumb. Cf.
Cowan v. Rogers, 10 L. R. A. 552; Jefferies
v. Shellon, 7 Forum, 227.
It follows that the policy is payable to
the administrator of the wife. Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of the jury, will
be taken for the defendant.

WARREN vs. BUCH.
Assumpsit for breach of contract-Damages that may be recovered in such
action-Whether the defendant is presumed to have notice of a previous contract of the vendee-Pennsylvania rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Timothy Warren,entered into a contract
with the Northern Railway Company to
do certain excavating and filling, and it
was stipulated that the said work should
be completed within sixty days from
April 1st, 1902, under a penalty of five
hundred dollars ($500). Warren required
the use of a steam shovel to complete the
work within the period named, and purchased one from the defendant, Simon
Buch, who agreed to deliver it on or before March 31st, 19.02. The shovel was not
delivered until May 1st, 1902, and the
plaintiff was unable to complete the work
for the railway as provided for in his eontract, and was compelled to pay the forfeit of five hundred dollars. Besides
plaintiff had employed workmen to begin
operations on April 1st, and owing to the
failure of the plaintiff to have the use of
the shovel, the work cost him, the plaintiff,

$300 more during the month of April than
it would have cost him had the shovel
been furnished. Again, after June 1st he
was compelled to pay higher wages until
the completion of the work on June 20th
than he had contracted to pay in April
and May, and this compelled an additional
outlay of $42.5.
He sues to recover these sums from the
defendant as damages incurred by reason
of his breach of contract.
CARLIN for the plaintiff.
Where a breach by one party occasions
injury to the other, which is susceptible of
compensation in damages, it does not relieve the other from liability under the
contract where both parties have gone on
and performed it for some time thereafter.
Robinson v. R. R. Co., 103 Mich. 610.
In contracts for the sale of goods the time
of delivery is of the very essence of the
contract.. Worrington v. Wright, 115 U.
S. 188; Liffists v. Wild, 167 Mass. 531.
Cooic for the defendant.
Where a vendor fails to comply with
his contract the general rule for the
measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time of the breach. McHose
v. Fulmer, 73 Pa. 365.
The damages claimed here are remote
and a defendant cannot be he!d responsible for the remote consequences of his act.
106 Mass. 542; 78 Mass. 135; 101 New York
209; 115 New York 579.
The damages that can be claimed are
those that naturally and ordinarily flow
from the breach. Drill Co. v. Wagner,
91 Pa. 92; Pennypacker v. Jones, 106 Pa.
237.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question involved in this case is one
of damages, arising from an alleged breach
of contract, and the general rule is:
Wherever one party toacontract has failed
in performing what he has undertaken to
do in favor of another contracting party,
the latter is entitled to compensation in
damages.
The general rule of damages is: That a
party failing to comply with the contract
is liable for the value of the goods in open
market., at the time of his failure, so that
if the plaintiff could have bought them
when the contract was broken for a higher
price, the difference is all that he can
recover. McHose v. Fulmer, 73 Pa. 365;
Culins v. Glass Works, 108 Pa. 220.
This question of damages is one for the
jury as to the market value, who may de-
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termine from the price before and after
the day of delivery, and from other sources
the actual market value. Kountz v. Kipatrick, 72 Pa. 376.
From the evidence in the case it does
not appear, that the plaintiff could not
obtain another shovel on the market, nor
does it appear that he tried to obtain one.
It was his duty when the defendant did
not supply the one contracted for, to try
to obtain another, even if he could not
obtain one of the same quality. It was his
duty to get one even if it was of an inferior quality, and he could recover the
actual loss, that is, the amount he would
lose by its not being able to do the same
amount of work, and the difference between contract price and market value.
Culins v. Fulner, 108 Pa. 220.
This contingency, whether the goods
are on'the market, is one which must be
considered to be in contemplation of the
parties, for they must be presumed to
know whether such articles are of limited
production or not, but this rule would not
apply here, as there may be many upon
the market, as we suppose there are, for
the statement of the plaintiff does not
show they are not upon the market,
nor does it show that plaintiff tried to obtain one and failed. Kountz v. Kilpatrick, 72 Pa. 376.
The damages in this case are also, in the
opinion of the court, too remote. They are
not such damages as ordinarily flow from
such a breach of contract, nor can it be
supposed they are such as were contemplated by the parties when they entered
into the contract, or such as might be
expected to follow its violation. Billmeyer
v. Wagner, 91 Pa. 92; Peunypacker v.
Jones, 106 Pa. 237.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the
defendant knew or contemplated that
plaintiff would have to hire so many men,
or, .that wages would advance, causing
him the expense now claimed; nor was it
communicated to him, that he would
have to pay a certain sum for not completing the work at a fixed time.
If the rule asked to be adopted in this
case would be used, where would the
limitbe? Why then the plaintiff could hire
five times as many men, or employ 6 or
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8 shovels as he saw fit. This rule would
lead to the ruin of men, because from some
event they could not perform their contract. Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles,
135 N. Y. 447.
We are of the opinion that the claim
for damages is not justified by the facts
in this case.
Judgment for defendant.
THOMAS LOURIMER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff, Warren, being in need of
a steam shovel, ordered one from the defendant, Buch, who agreed to deliver it
before March 31st, 1902. The shovel was
not tendered until May 1st, 1902, at which
time, however, it appears that the plaintiff
accepted it. For this delay of a month and
a day the plaintiff asks for a judgment for
one thousand two hundred and twentyfive dollars, the amount of the loss which,
it is not denied, he has suffered.
In the first place, it is urged that the
plaintiff's acceptance of the shovel may
fairly be interpreted as a waiver by him
of the seller's default in the time of delivery. Tfhere are cases which decide that
an acceptance is to be so regarded unless
qualified by a reservation of the right to
claim damages. Minneapolis Threshing
Machine Co. v. Hutchins, 65 Minn. 89;
Bock v. Healey, 8 Daly, 156. In the
present case, however, the plaintiff doubtless expected each day that the ordered
shovel would arrive promptly. The longer
the delay, the more pressing became his
need. Fiually, when the shovel was tendered, his predicament left him practically
no choice. It is settled thatin such a case,
unless there are other circumstances showing an intention to waive the seller's delay, the acceptance is not to be so construed. He cannot be said to take the
goods voluntarily, but rather under a sort
of duress or compulsion. Industrial Works
v. Mitchell, 114 Mich. 29; Ruff v. Rinaldo,
55 N. Y. 664.
In contracts for the sale of goods the
time of delivery is of the very essence of
the contract. Worrington v. Wright, 115
U. S. 188; Lifferts v. Weld, 167 Mass. 531.
The defendant's breach being admitted,
we are unable to see how the court below
should have seen fit to enter judgment in
his favor. In any event the plaintiff is
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entitled to nominal damages. But, as we
will now show, we are of the opinion that
in the present case they may justly be
made very substantial.
As we understand the position of the
learned court below, it is this: The
measure of damages for the non-delivery
of goods is the value of the goods, if the
price has been paid; otherwise, the difference between the contract price and the
market price. Since this rule is based on
the theory that the buyer must satisfy his
need elsewhere at the market price, and
since the plaintiff does not appear to have
pursued this course, he, therefore, has not
suffered this damage. Again, all the
claims for damages that he makes are for
remote losses. Conclusion-he can recover
nothing.
We are inclined to agree with both of
tile foregoing premises, but we think the
conclusion iga non sequitus. Suppose the
plaintiff had paid for the shovel at the
time of ordering it. Surely he is entitled
to interest on the price for the period of
the delay in delivery. Edwards v. Sanborn, 6 Mich. 848. Again, suppose he did
prefer to wait till the shovel ordered arrived. Surely he is entitled to the value
of the use of a shovel for the period of the
delay. We are told that "owing to the
failure of the plaintiff to have the use of
the shovel, the work cost him $300
more during the month of April than it
would have cost him had the shovel been
furnished." How did he conduct the
work during April? We'are not told. If
he could do so, he doubtless rented a
shovel elsewhere. Whether he did so or
not, if the $300 claimed does not exceed
the rental value of a shovel for one month,
we are of the opinion that such a sum is
an item of damage quite proximate enough
to enter into the verdict. Brownell v.
Chapman, 84 Iowa 504 ; Brown v. Foster,
51 Pa. 165; Griffin v. Clover, 16 N. Y. 489.
In Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Pa. 365, the
defendant agreed to furnish for the coal
company a locomotive engine of a particular size. Such an engine was the only
kind the company could use and they
were not to be procured elsewhere. There
was a delay in the delivery, and the company was compelled to transport its coal
by horse-power, as it had done before. The
trial court said that the measure of dam-

ages for the delay was the "ordinary hire
of a locomotive during the period of the
delay." On appeal it was held that as the
latter accepting the order provided for a
delivery of the engine on the track of the
plaintiffs, the defendants must be regarded
as having notice that the plaintiffs intended to use the engine at once. They,
therefore, laid down the measure of damages to be the loss of the economy which
would have been effected by the substitution of mechanical power for horse-power.
If the present contract contained a provision for the delivery of the shovel at the
field of the plaintiff's operations on the
Northern Railway, the defendant may
fairly be held to the measure of damages
laid down in Coal Co. v. Foster. This
would doubtless cover the $300 claimed.
In any event, however, he can recover the
rental value of the shovel, as stated above.
Since thb decision in Hadley v. Boxendale, 9 Ex. 341, cases of this class have
"resolved themselves into a continuous
commentary upon it." This leading case,
as in the case before us, involved the
measure of damages for delay in deliveri og
a piecebf machinery. The defendant was
not held liable for the losses incident to
the stopping of a mill in which the machinery was to be used, because there was
no evidence that he had been made aware
that such a loss would result from his delay. Under the rule of this case, which
has been repeatedly approved in Pennsylvania, we agree with the court below that
the $500 item and the $425 item are for
losses too remote to be allowed. The defendant does not appear to have had any
notice of the terms of the contract between
the plaintiff and the Northern Railway
Company. The counsel for the plaintiff
has laboriously argued that the $500 was
liquidated damages and not a penalty, but
under the view we have taken this becomes entirely immaterial now, whatever
may be its importance as between the
plaintiff and the railroad company.
Judgment reversed, with v. f. d. n.
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INRE ESTATE OF BERT WAPLES. mutually liable, one to the other, and shall

Capacity of an illegitimate to inheritStatus of an illegitimate-Act of July 10,
1901, construed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Bert Waples, deceased, died November
27, 1901, leaving real and personal property. He left to survive him two sisters
and a niece, daughter of a deceased brother,
and a nephew, a son of a deceased sister.
Before the auditor, in September, 1903, it
was shown that the son of the deceased
sister was a bastard. The auditor decided
that the son could not take the mother's
share. Exceptions to his report were filed.
CARLIN for the plaintiff.

Cites Act of April 27, 1855, Act of July
10, 1901.
The Legislature has power to remove the
taint of illegitimacy either by a general or
a special law for all purposes of future inheritance. Brown on Decedents' Estates,
Vol. 1, page 248.
FLYNN for the defendant.

Cites Act of April 8, 1833; April 27, 1855;
1 P. & L. 2420; Act of June 14, 1897; 3 P.
& L. 349; Act July 10, 1901.
The title of the Act of July 10, 1901, provides that it is "An act.to regulate-and define the legal relations of an illegitimate
child or children, its or their heirs, with
each other, and the mother and her heirs."
The act makes no provision for repealing
the Act of 1833, but is intended to regulate
the legal relations of the mother and the
child.
The title of the act may be esteemed to
have some of the qualities of a preamble,
and may, therefore, be used as a good
means for collecting the intent of the
makers.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Although the efforts of counsel on both
sides were extended in an attempt to procure authority along the lines involved in
this case, they were in vain, and the court
has likewise been unable to find anything
in the books, either State or county decisions, that applies to the point at issue.
The decision seems to hinge on the construction of a few words in the Act of Assembly of July 10, 1901, defining the legal
relation existing between a bastard child,
or children, its or their heirs, and the
mother of such bastard child and hef heirs.
Section I of the act says, inter alia :
"But the mother and her heirs, and her
illegitimate child and its heirs, shall be

enjoy all the rights and privileges, one to
the other, and in the same manner and to
the same extent as if said child or children
had been born in lawful wedlock."
Section II enlarges on the rights and
privileges of the mother and the children,
as follows: "The mother of an illegitimate
child, her heirs and legal representatives,
and said illegitimate child or children, its
or their heirs and legal representatives,
shall have capacity to take or Inherit from
or through each other, personal estate as
next of kin, and real estate as heirs in fee
simple, or otherwise, under the intestate
laws of this Commonwealth, in the same
manner and to the same extent, subject to
the distinction of half-bloods, as if said
child or children had been born in lawful
wedlock."
Section IV gives the intent of the act, as
follows: "The intent of this act is to legitimate an illegitimate child and its heirs as
to its mother and her heirs."
We place the turning point at the words,
"and her heirs," in section IV of the act.
Who are the heirs of the mother? If Bert
Waples is an heir of the mother of the
bastard, then the mother's son can take
through her, her share in the estate of
Bert Waples.
has been defined to
The word "heir"
mean: "He upon whom the law casts his
ancestor'sestate immediately on the death
of the ancestor." Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, 1st Ed., Vol. 9, p. 357.
Can it be said that Bert Waples is an
"ancestor" of this bastard son? We think
not; we construe the word "ancestor" to
relate exclusively to the direct line of lineal
descendants and ascendants. Waples is
only collaterally related. We believe that
the word "heirs" in the statute cannot relate to collateral relatives, and in this case
the only ancestor of the bastard known to
the law is the sister of Waples. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary defines the word "ancestor" to mean: "One who has preceded
another in a direct line of descent; an ascendant ; a former possessor; the person
last seized."
In this case the sister of Bert Waples
was not seized, for she died before the
estate could vest in her; following this line,
the son could not inherit anythingfrom
her in it.
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The remaining question is: Could he
take anything through her in it? We are
of opinion that, construing the statute
strictly and in accordance with the intent
expressed in section IV, as the mother of
the bastard was not strictly an heir of
Waples, but only collaterally related, and
as the act does not legitimatize the bastard
as to the collateral relatives of the mother,
he is unable to take her sharefrom Waples
in connection with the heirs, under the
intestate laws of this Commonwealth.
The exceptions to the report of the auditor
are dismissed, and the report confirmed.
GILLESPIE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

At common law, the illegitimate was
nulliusfilius, the son neither of father nor
mother. Hence neither parent, nor the
kin of either parent, could inherit from or
through it, nor could it, or its heirs, inherit
from the parents or their kin.
A partial legitimation began with the
Act of April 27, 1855, 1 P. & L. 2420. The
mother and the child were recognized by
that act as of kin, simply in order to enable each to inherit from the other.
Relatives of the mother could neither inherit property from nor transmit it to the
child. Hence, her brothers and sisters
could not inherit from the child. Grubb's
Appeal, 58 Pa. 55. Even the children of
the predeceased child could not inherit
from the mother. Steckel's Appeal, 64
Pa. 493. Illegitimate children of the same
mother, could not inherit from each other.
Woltemate's Appeal, 86 Pa. 219. The Act
of June 5th, 1883, 1 P. & L. 2420, enabled
them to inherit from each other, when
the deceased left to survive him, neither
mother nor legitimate issue.
The Act of June 14th, 1897, 3 P. & L.
349, extended the classes capable of inheriting, in cases of illegitimacy, so as to
embrace the children and their issue, the
mother and the grandmother. All these
were given "capacity to take or inherit
from each other." The act of June 10,
1901, P. L. 551, made all children of the
same mother, whether legitimate or illegitimate, and dying without lawful issue,
capable of inheriting from each other, to
the exclusion of the grandmother.
At the same session of the legislature,
the act, P. L. 639, was passed, which it is
inexpedient to quote. After an examina-

tion of it we have reached the conclusion
that its purpose was to "legitimate" the
bastard so far as its mother was concerned,
but to allow it, as respects its father, to be,
as heretofore, the son of nobody. The
"common law doctrine shall not apply, as
between the mother and her illegitimate
child or children.", The illegitimate child
and the mother "shall have capacity to
take or inherit tfrom or through each
other." To inherit through the mother,
can mean simply to inherit from some one
from whom, had she been alive, she would
have inherited; to inherit by representation. No distinction is made between ancestors of the mother; or collateral relatives
of whom she might be heir. From the
father or the mother of the mother, the
illegitimate could inherit. Why not from
her brother or uncle? The act does not
discriminate.
The fourth section of the act declares
that the intent of it is to "legitimate" the
child and its heirs, as to its mother and
her heirs, (and not as to its mother and
those of whom she would, if surviving, be
an heir). But the object of the section was
evidently to contrast the legitimacy of the
child, as respects the mother,, with its
perpetuated illegitimacy as respects the
father. The direction in section 2, that
the child shall have capacity to inherit
through as well as from the mother,
shows that the intent of the act is not
fully expressed in the 4th section, for to
inherit through the mother, is to inherit
from one to whom she, had she survived,
would have been an heir; and not from
one who would be her heir.
We think the intention of the legislature was to destroy the distinction between
legitimates and illegitimates, so far as the
mother and those related through her to
the children are concerned.
It follows that one fourth of the estate
of Bert Waples should be paid to the
nephew.
Decree reversed with procedendo.
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JOHN PETERS vs. SOLOMON
BRINDLE.
HTusband and wife-Validity of agreement to separate-Liabilityof husband
for necessariesfurnishedto the wife after
the separation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Solomon Brindle was intermarried with
They failed to live
Catherine Jones.
amicably together and finally agreed to
separate, and a formal agreement was
entered into, providing that the husband
should pay $1,000 to his wife, and they
were to live separate and apart hereafter,
she releasing all right of dower and interest in his estate, and all claims for support and maintenance. They so lived for
five years. During this time she expended
the money so received, and purchased
from the plaintiff, John Peters, groceries
and provisions necessary for her support,
amounting to the sum of $100. The latter
was aware of the terms of the agreement
of separation. She being unable to pay,
Peters brought suit against her husband,
and asks for judgment on the facts stated.
FERGUSON and OwEN for the plaintiff.

The husband is liable for necessaries
supplied to the wife unless she has competent provisions from him or from some
fund of his own. 2 Ashmead 140.
The deed of separation was not binding,
as confidential relations existing between
the parties requires a free and full disclosure by the husband of all his property,
and the consideration for the separation
was wholly disproportionate to the estate.
195 Pa. 26.
OYER and MCALEE for the defendant.
Agreements for the separation of husband and wife are valid; provided their
object be actual and immediate and not a
contingent future separation. Lehr v.
Beaver, 8 W. & S. 102; Hutton v. Hutton,
3 Pa. 100; Hitner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110.
The husband may bind himself to give
to his wife certain money and property,
and the wife may agree to release him and
his estate from all claims for maintenance
and interest in his estate. Com. v.
Richards, 131 Pa. 209.
A party who deals with a married
woman known to be living apart from
her husband, is put upon inqury as to the
cause of the separation. Comi. v. Richards, supra; Carey v. Patten, 2 Ash. 140.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question arising upon the facts of
the case is: Are articles of separation, as

entered into, valid and binding upon the
parties, or void and subject to repudiation
at will? Presumably, one of the first cases
in Pennsylvania decided upon this point
is Hutton v. Duey, 103 Pa. 100, and decided in 1846. In this case Judge Rodgers
laid down the rule that deeds for separation of husband and wife are valid and
effectual both in law and in equity, provided their objects be actual and immediate and not a contingent or future separation. Also Lehr v. Beaver, 8 W. & S. 102,
arose about the same time and was decided in the same manner on similar
point. In Dillinger's Appeal, 35 Pa. 360,
Judge Woodward held that such articles of
separation, while not destroying relation
of husband and wife for some purposes,
did amount to a total surrender of all
property rights. If there be in any case a
reconciliation, waiving or abandonment of
the deed, it would have become invalidated. Hitner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110. But
there is no evidence to that effect in this
case, instead, facts show that deed had been
faithfully carried out for period of five
years.
In nearly all the early cases a trustee
was appointed to carry out such agreements, but the present undoubted weight
of authority seems to be that there may be
a valid agreement for separation directly
between husband and wife without the intervention of a trustee, which courts will
sanction. Hutton v. Duey, supra. Garver
v. Miller, 16 Ohio 527; Randall v. Randall,
27 Mich. 563. In this former case Mr.
Justice Clark says "that a valid agreement
may be made for a separation between
husband and wife and for an allowance for
her support, where separation is inevitable
and immediate, is now too well settled to
admit of discussion." There seems to be
no doubt that such agreement must be
based upon a good consideration and must
also be reasonable in its terms. Scott's
Estate, 147 Pa. 102. And, there is also no
doubt that if such agreement be entered
into by one party by reason of fraud, such
as a gross misrepresentation by the husband as to amount and value of property
owned by him, that such agreement
would be declared void by the courts. A
contract of this nature cannot be sustained
unless it was entered into with full
knowledge of both parties, necessary to
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enable them to act intelligently and understandingly. Frank's Appeal, 195 Pa. 26.
We believe there was such understanding in pr?sent case. There is no circumstance given from which we can infer fraud
upon the wife, neither coercion or concealment, and conclusion is that she was fully
aware of conditions as existed at time of
separation.
All requirements for a valid separation
being present in this case we are disposed
to treat it as such and direct judgment to
be entered in favor of the defendant.
FLEITZ, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

If the agreement for separation between
Solomon 'and Catherine Brindle was
valid, those who sold goods to her were
bound to know of it and were affected by
its terms. Peters in fact knew of the agreement. He could not regard her, in making purchases as the agent of the husband.
Carey v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140.
Could Mrs. Brindle avoid the articles?
They had "failed to live amicably together." They agreed immediately to separate. They did immediately separate.
They have remained separate for five
years.
No intimation is given that any fraud
was practiced on Mrs. Brindle. The
amount of money given to her, $1,000, is
comparatively small, but we have no information as to the size of Solomon
Brindle's estate at the time of the making
of the articles. Th $1,000 may have been
a large proportion, or even all of that
which he had. Frank's Estate, 195 Pa.
26; Commonwealth v. Richards, 131 Pa.
209.
In the absence of evidence of a greaT
disparity between the money given to the
wife, and the property of the husband,
we do not think the burden is on the
husband to show that he did not deceive
or constrain his wife into the acceptance
of the provision, or accept from her,
ignorant of his financial state, the renunciation of her rights.
The burden,
rather, would be on the plaintiff.
The participation of a friend or trustee,
in the article of separation, is not necessary
to its validity. Com. v. Richards, 131 Pa.
209, and case there cited.
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. SALTONHALL.
Character evidence- Testimony of accomplice-Duty of court not to "obfuscate"
discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Saltonhall, 45 years old, and Adams,
only 19, were arrested for burglary on suspicion. Adams confessed at once, implicating Saltonhall. The Commonwealth,
intending to use him as a witness, had
Saltonhall only indicted.
Adams was the only witness for the
Commonwealth except Janney, who swore
that he saw them about forty feet from the
house running away from it about 11 p. m.,
and that the burglary must have occurred
between 10 and 11 p. m.
Witnesses for Saltonhall, twenty-five iii
number, testified to his good reputation
for honesty, law-abidingness, etc.
The Commbnwealth furnished no impeaching character evidence.
The Court charged: "If you have doubt
of defendant's guilt, consider the evidence
as to his character. Would such a man
be likely to commit so grave a crime? If,
however, you are quite convinced that
Adams is a truthful man, and has told the
truth here, you need not trouble yourselves with Saltonhall's character. You
may, however, oppose the improbability of
Saltonhall's doing the act, having the
character he has, to the probability that
Adams has told the truth, and if doing so,
you doubt reasonably, the guilt of Saltonhall, acquit him."
Yocum, attorney for appellant.
In felonies or misdemeanors, court
should charge jury not to convict on the
u ncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 380; Rex v.
Foster, 8 C. & P. 106; Carroll v. Com., 84
Pa. 107; Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424.
Evidence of good reputation is substantive evidence. It is not a mere makeweight. Sayop v. Com., 21 Sup. Ct. 75;
Com. v. Bleary, 135 Pa. 64; Hanney v.
Com., 116 Pa. 322; Heine v. Com., 91 Pa.
145.
HOUCK, attorney for appellee.
A jury may convict in Pennsylvania on
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Watson v. Com., 28 Pittsb. L. Jr.
89 ; Cox v. Cow., 125 Pa. 94 ; Com. v. Craig,
.19 Sup. Ct. 94.
Evidence of good character is substantive, and the court presented this with
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sufficient clearness. Corn. v. Carey, 2
Brew. 406; Heine v. Coin., 91 Pa. 145;
Hanney v. Com., 116 Pa. 322; Com. v.
Cleary, 135 Pa. 64; Kilpatrick v. Coin., 31
Pa. 198.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This appeal raises two questions: 1st.
Whether the charge of the court was erroneous; and 2d. Whether it was necessary
for the court to give special instructions as
to the weight to be given to the testimony
of aii accomplice.
The first point, in which it was alleged
that the court committed error, was in the
charge of the court to the jury. Let us
consider the first sentence: "If you have
doubt of defendant's guilt, consider the
evidence ofhis character." That is to say,
that if, after considering all the evidence
except that of character, they should still
be in doubt that they could consider the
evidence as to character. In Heine v. Com.
91 Pa. 145, the charge of the lower court
was similar to that of the present case.
The Supreme Court said: "The learned
judge of the court below committed error
in saying to the jury, "If a man is guilty,
his previous good character has nothing
to do with the case, but if you have doubt
as to his guilt, then character steps in and
aids in determining that doubt. The effect
of this was to give the evidence of good
character no weight whatever, for if the
other testimony left in the minds of the
jury a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt, this of itself, without more, entitles
him to an acquittal. Evidence of good
character is not a mere make-weight,
thrown in to assist in the production of a
result that would happen in all events, but
it is positive evidence, and may of itself,
by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produce an acquittal." In Hanney v. Corn.
116 Pa. 322, the lower court charged : "If
you believe that the testimony in this case
clearly points the guilt of John Hanney,
then his previous good character should
have no weight in determining the question ofhis guilt or innocence. If, however,
you think that the Commonwealth have
made out but a weak case, that while possibly it might be sufficient for conviction,
still the case is a weak one, there the testimony as to good character ought to have
weight with you, with strength sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt in his favor,
which reasonable doubt would inure to his

acquittal." The Supreme Court said: "In
criminal prosecutions, the evidence as to
the good character of the defendant is to
be regarded as evidence of the substantive
fact, like any other facts tending to establish defendant's innocence, and it ought to
be so regarded by court and jury. It is
true, where the Commonwealth has clearly
and indubitably established defendant's
guilt, good character is of no avail, but in
such event the same may be said of any
other evidence, however positive, which
defendant may have given; nevertheless,
to say to thejury in the case supposed, that
the evidence is to be disregarded, would
clearly be error, for of the evidence and its
effect, the jury are the sole judges. Character is of importance in this, it may of itself, in spite of all evidence to the contrary,
raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jury and so produce an acquittal. An
honest man may, through malice or otherwise, be charged with crime, and his life
or liberty be endangered by fallacious circumstances or perjury, and he may be able
to produce no evidence to prove his innocence except his own oath, and if in such
a case a blameless and unstained character
are of no avail, are a mere make-weight
only in a doubtful case, his condition is a
sad one; but, fortunately, for the upright
man so situated, we have got beyond all
doubt on this subject, and have established
the doctrine that evidence of good character is to be regarded as a substantive fact
like any other tending'to establish defendant's innocence, and ought to be so regarded by court and jury."
The above
principles have been upheld in Com. v.
Cleary, 135 Pa. 83; Com. v. Sayars, 21
Pa. Sup. 75. The conclusion of the court,
therefore, is that the first sentence of the
charge is erroneous.
The next sentence of the charge is: "If,
however, you are quite convinced that
Adams is a truthful man, and he told the
truth here, you need not trouble yourselves
with Saltonhall's character." In Com. v.
Hanney, supra, the Supreme Court said:
"It is true where the Commonwealth has
clearly and indubitably established the
defendant's guilt, good character is of no
avail, but in such event the same may be
said of any other evidence, however positive, which defendant may have given;
nevertheless, to say to the jury that the
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understand clearly what effect was to be
evidence is to be disregarded, would clearly
given to the character evidence, as the
be error, for of the evidence and its weight,
Commonwealth relied almost exclusively
the jury are the sole judges." Consequently, it was error oil the part of the on the testimony of an accomplice, whose
lower court to take away from the jury testimony should be received with caution.
the right to consider the evidence of de- The first assignment of error is sustained.
The second assignment of error relates
fendant's character, no matter how overto whether the court below committed
whelming tle evidence of the Commonerror in not instructing the jury that the
wealth is, as the jury might disregard it
evidence of an accomplice should be reall and acquit, which they have a right to
ceived with caution. It is a rule of evido.
dence that the degree of credit which
In the conclusion of the charge the court
ought to be given to the testimony of an
said: "You may, however, oppose the
improbability of Saltonhall's doing the accomplice is a matter exclusively within
the province of thejury. Such testimony
act, having the character he has, to the
should, however, be weighed with caution.
probability that Adams has told the truth,
The jury may, if they see proper, act upon
aud if doing so, you doubt reasonably the
the evidence of an accomplice without any
guilt of Saltonhall, acquit." This portion
It is
of the charge was in accordance with the corroboration of his statements.
usual to advise juries not to convict on the
rules of evidence as regards character evitestimony of an accomplice alone and
dence, as it allowed the jury to consider
without corroboration. Carrol v. Corn.,
the evidence as to character in connection
with the other evidence, thereby instruct- 84 Pa. 113; Kilrow v. Com., 89 Pa. 480;
Com. v. Carey, 2 Brew. 406. In Com. v.
ing the jury that it was substantive eviCox, 125 Pa. 100, the court, in answer to a
dence in itself.
point, said that there must be corroborThis charge is erroneous as to the first
ation of the accomplice in a material
part, but correct as to the balance. The
point. The Supreme Court said that this
question then is, whether the latter part
was more favorable to the defendant than
wipes out the mistake made by the court
in the first part of the charge. In Com. he was entitled to. A jury may believe
an uncorroborated acccomplice, and if his
v. Sayars, 21 Pa. Sup. 75, the lower court,
testimony produces in their miuds a conin the first part of his charge, stated that
viction of defendant's guilt, they may
good character should be considered in a
convict. If the testimony of the accoma
doubtful case, or in a case where after
plice, his manner of testifying, and his
summing up ofall the testimony carefully,
appearance upon the stand impress a jury
the jury are in an equilibrium or almost
with the truth of his statements, there is
balanced. Later in the charge the court
no inflexible rule of law which prevents a
said that good character is substantive
conviction. It is for the trial judge, who
and should always be considered. In this
also heard the witness, noticed his manner
case the Superior Court held that the
and appearance upon the stand, and who
charge was misleading and contradictory,
can judge equally with the jury as to his
legal
as
a
because it presented to the jury
credibility, to say whether he is satisfied
definition of good character two antagowith the verdict. If both jury and court
nistic and inconsistent statements as to
are satisfied that he has told the truth,
the effect to be given to good character by
there is no reason why the verdict should
is
difficult
the jury in its deliberations. It
to determine what instruction the jury ac- not stand. No case in Pennsylvania has
gone so far as to expressly decide that it
cepted as the law. It is apparent they
was necessary for the court to caution the
are contradictory, and the liberty of a citiin regard to the testimony of an acjury
zen should not be imperiled by repugnant
complice, although from the opinion of
statements of the effect to be given to good
character by a jury. The same error was the court in Cox v. Com., supra, it would
seem that if the trial court was satisfied
committed by the court below in the case
with the verdict that it would be sustained
at bar. His charge to the jury was inconby the Supreme Court. In this case, howsistent and contradictory. It was highly
ever, there has been very material corrobjury
important to the defendant that the

THE FORUM
oration in the unimpeached testimony of mony ; and that, if thus opposing the forJanney, who saw the defendant and the mer to the latter, they reasonably doubt
confessed accomplice, Adams, near the Saltonhall's guilt, they should acquit him.
place where the robbery was committed at
We differ from the learned court below
or about the time of its commission. It
as to the effect of these instructions on the
shows the possibility of their having com- jurors' minds. If they were dolts, they
mitted the crime. Where there has been were probably obfuscated by the court's
corroboration, it seems unnecessary to give charge, but if they had that modest modiany special instruction as to the weight to cum of good sense and intelligence that
often characterizes jurors, they probably
be given to the accomplice's testimony. It
would be necessary, however, where there understood that they were to consider the
has not been any corroboration of the ac- character evidence in determining whether
complice's testimony. In the case at bar, to believe Adams. We scarcely think the
as the court and jury were satisfied with danger that there was misapprehension,
the verdict, it will not be set aside on that great enough to justify a reversal. It
ground. The second assignment of error must be borne in mind that there is alis overruled, however, as the trial court ways a risk that. even the clearest aDd most
committed error in its charge to the jury. lucid instructions will be misunderstood
The cause will have to go back for a new by a jury. The use of the most precise
and terse expressions does not guarantee a
trial.
Judgment reversed with venire facias correct interpretation. The question is always one of probability. Cases would be
de novo.
JAMES, J.
rare in which the appellate court, if a wise
one, could feel sure that there had been no
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The criticism by the Superior Court of misunderstanding on the part of any juror.
The instruction in Kilpatrick v. Commonthe first part of the charge of the trial court
is doubtless correct. It does virtually tell wealth, 31 Pa. 198, though more suseeptthe jury that they need not consider the ible of misunderstanding than that of the
character evidence until they satisfy them- court below, was not deemed a justificaselves whether they "are quite convinced tion for a reversal.
that Adams is a truthful man and has told
With the doctrine of the learned Superthe truth here." But these words are im- ior Court, concerning the instruction with
mediately followed by an explicit direction
regard to the testimony of an accomplice,
that they may oppose the improbability of we are quite satisfied.
Judgment reversed and that of the Oyer
Saltonhall's guilt, founded on his character, to the probability of Adams' testi- and Terminer reinstated.
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